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INTRODUCTION 
 Ernest Clayton Harper pleaded guilty to stalking. The plea agreement 
provided, “The State agrees to a two-step 76-3-402 reduction if I comply 100% 
with all terms and conditions of AP&P probation.” Harper moved to 
withdraw his guilty plea after he found out that AP&P was going to 
recommend prison. Harper argued that his plea was unknowing and 
involuntary because he was pressured into pleading due to his mental 
condition, and his attorney at the time told him he was guaranteed probation.  
 Harper has changed tack on appeal, arguing that the prosecutor 
promised to recommend probation but breached that agreement. 
Alternatively, he argues that the language of the plea agreement misled him 
-2- 
into thinking the prosecutor was going to recommend probation. He also 
argues that if the prosecutor did not intend to recommend probation, 
Harper’s counsel was ineffective for not making the prosecutor correct his 
contrary “false statement” in the plea agreement. 
 This case also involves a consolidated appeal with another stalking 
case of Harper’s. But Harper has withdrawn his claim of error in the other 
case. Harper suggests that severance of the two appellate cases is necessary 
because of a supposed jurisdictional defect in that other case. While the Court 
may sever the cases, severance is not necessary because any jurisdictional 
problem would be limited to the specific case in which it arises. 
 While there is no jurisdictional problem in the appeal Harper has 
abandoned, this Court does not have jurisdiction in the appeal that Harper 
has not abandoned. Harper filed a timely motion to withdraw his guilty plea, 
but he did not challenge his plea on the bases he now raises. This Court has 
held that the Plea Withdrawal Statute bars appellate consideration—even for 
plain error or ineffective assistance—of challenges not specifically raised 
below. 
 If this Court disagrees that Harper’s challenges are unpreserved, it 
should affirm the district court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his plea. 
Harper has not established that his plea was unknowing or involuntary. 
-3- 
Because the language of the plea agreement is ambiguous, Harper had to 
present extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent. He presented no evidence to 
establish that the prosecutor agreed to recommend probation or that Harper 
genuinely and legitimately thought that the prosecutor had done so. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
 1. Is severance of the consolidated appeal necessary? 
 Standard of Review. Because this issue arises for the first time on appeal, 
addresses the authority of the appellate court, and does not ask this Court to 
review any (in)action by the district court, no standard of review applies. 
 2. Does this Court have jurisdiction to address challenges to Harper’s 
guilty plea that he did not raise in his timely motion to withdraw that plea? 
 Standard of Review. Same as for Issue 1. 
 3. If this Court has jurisdiction, did the district court act within its 
discretion when it concluded that Harper had not shown that his plea was 
unknowing or involuntary? 
 Standard of Review. A court’s denial of a motion to withdraw a plea is 
reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. Magness, 2017 UT App 130, ¶16, 402 
P.3d 105. 
-4- 
 4. If this Court has jurisdiction, has Harper proved that counsel was 
ineffective for not requiring the prosecutor to clarify during the plea colloquy 
that the plea bargain did not contain a promise to recommend probation? 
 Standard of Review. No standard of review applies to a claim of 
ineffective assistance brought for the first time on appeal. State v. Bunker, 2019 
UT App 118, ¶8, --- P.3d ----. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 This consolidated appeal involves two cases against Ernest Clayton 
Harper in which the district court imposed prison sentences during a global 
sentencing. 
The First Case 
 In case 131401036 (the first case), Harper pleaded guilty to one count 
of third-degree felony stalking for violating a civil stalking injunction 
obtained by his now ex-wife. R036:4, 38, 50.1 The probable cause statement 
accompanying the information stated that the same day his ex-wife received 
the injunction, Harper texted her and sent a topless picture of her to her 
 
1 The State cites the record using the last three digits of the trial court 
case number in italics, with a colon preceding the page number in the case 
record. Thus, “R036:4” refers to page 4 in the record of the first case (case 
131401036). 
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family members and employer and posted it online. R036:2–3. After pleading 
guilty, Harper was placed on probation. R036:81.  
The First Appeal of the First Case 
 Harper appealed after the court sentenced him to probation, with the 
appellate case designated as 20140030-CA. R036:92, 111–12. But on appeal, 
Harper did not challenge his sentence; rather, he challenged his plea despite 
not having moved to withdraw his plea before his sentence was announced. 
R036:396–97. This Court summarily dismissed the appeal for lack of 
jurisdiction. R036:396–97. 
Revocation of Probation in the First Case 
 Twenty-one months after sentencing, Harper admitted that he violated 
the terms of his probation by contacting his ex-wife, but the court continued 
probation. R036:207, 336. About a year and a half later, Harper’s probation 
officers arrested him for suspected custodial interference when he did not 
return his son to Harper’s ex-wife. R036:480. As he was transported to jail, 
Harper kicked one officer several times and head-butted another. R036:480. 
Harper later admitted he violated his probation by committing attempted 
assault by a prisoner. R036:714, 720–21. The court revoked Harper’s 




The Second Appeal of the First Case 
 Harper appealed from the order revoking his probation and imposing 
the original prison sentence, with the appellate case designated as 20180250-
CA. R036:615, 631. This is one of the appeals at issue here. 
The Second Case 
 In case 161911938 (the second case),2 the probable cause affidavit 
averred that Harper sent hundreds of texts to an ex-girlfriend over a three-
week period and threatened to send nude pictures of her to her employer to 
get her fired; he also went to his ex-girlfriend’s apartment complex after 
management had told him not to return, and he would not leave when they 
told him to. R938:2.3 
 Harper was charged with criminal trespass, a class B misdemeanor, 
and stalking, originally filed as a third-degree felony and later amended to a 
second. R938:1–2, 78. With the assistance of counsel (plea counsel), Harper 
 
2 Although the global sentencing involved resolution of more than two 
cases against Harper, the State uses the “first” and “second” designations for 
ease of reference. 
3 This occurred while Harper was still on probation in the first case, 
about a year after the court had continued probation and about eight months 
before Harper assaulted the probation officers. R036:431, 480. The court 
entered an order to show cause in the first case based on the allegations in the 
second case, but with the parties’ agreement the court held the matter 
pending resolution of the second case. R036:437, 452, 458. 
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pleaded guilty to stalking as a second-degree felony. R938:160, 166. In 
exchange, the trespassing charge was dropped and the State agreed to 
recommend release to Adult Probation & Parole supervision “pending 
sentencing.” R938:160. The plea statement also said, “The State agrees to a 
two-step 76-3-402 reduction if I comply 100% with all terms and conditions 
of AP&P probation.” R938:160. But Harper volunteered at the hearing that he 
“realize[d] that the penalty of this guilty plea could … put [him] in prison.” 
R938:597. And during the subsequent colloquy Harper confirmed that he 
understood when the court said it could sentence him to prison even though 
“[s]omething less may be recommended.” R938:602. The court accepted the 
plea, ordered Harper’s release, and directed AP&P to complete a presentence 




. The motion did not state a basis for withdrawal. R938:184. 
Represented by new counsel (withdrawal counsel), Harper later filed another 
motion to withdraw the plea in which he argued that his plea was 
involuntary because of his emotional instability at the time, and it was 
unknowing because his plea counsel’s advice had misled him. R938:306–07. 
-8- 
Harper provided a declaration stating that his plea counsel “told me I’ll get 
probation” and that Harper “did not know that by pleading guilty, I could be 
sent to prison.” R938:309. He added, “I did not know that AP&P would 
recommend prison.” R938:309. 
 At the hearing on the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, Harper’s 
withdrawal counsel acknowledged that Harper understood the court could 
impose imprisonment, but he argued that Harper “expected that he would 
get probation.” R938:632. He pointed to Harper’s emotional instability and 
the statement of his plea counsel “that he would get probation if he pled as 
charged.” R938:631–33. Harper’s withdrawal counsel also pointed to the 
language of the plea agreement, which said the State would agree to a two-
step reduction “if I comply 100% with all terms and conditions of AP&P 
probation.” R938:160, 631–32, 635–36, 639. His withdrawal counsel argued 
that, at least to a non-lawyer, that language “clearly would imply” that “the 
State is agreeing that he will receive probation.” R938:631–32. His withdrawal 
counsel stated that Harper would not have had “a problem with the plea” if 
AP&P and the prosecutor recommended probation. R938:636. But he claimed 
that given the language of the plea agreement and his plea counsel’s 
“statement that he would get probation,” Harper “was misled” into pleading 
-9- 
guilty. R938:636, 639. His withdrawal counsel made no proffer of what 
Harper actually understood the language of the plea agreement to mean.  
 The prosecutor proffered that “we never talked about probation being 
agreed upon,” and he emphasized that it would have been in the plea 
statement if it was part of the agreement. R938:635. 
 The district court found that Harper understood that prison was a 
possibility when he pleaded guilty and that there was no basis for Harper 
thinking “he had a guarantee of probation.” R938:639. The court noted that it 
had told Harper he could be sentenced to prison, and the court found it “very 
difficult to think” that Harper’s plea counsel “would have ever told him that 
there wasn’t a possibility of prison and that what the sentence was would be 
up to the judge.” R938:638. The court denied the motion, explaining that 
“find[ing] out he has a prison recommendation” was not a valid basis to 
withdraw a plea. R938:638.  
Sentencing on the Second Case 
 After the district court denied Harper’s motion to withdraw his plea, 
but before sentencing, Harper—who was still represented by counsel at the 
time—sent the court a dozen letters or pro se motions addressing his plea. 
R938:339–51, 357, 370, 381–85, 433, 439–51, 455, 458–60, 488–98, 506, 510, 514–
16. In them, Harper acknowledged that the court would decide what sentence 
-10- 
to impose, but he argued that he had “sign[ed] a deal for probation with the 
prosecutor”; Harper asked either for the prosecutor to “keep the deal it 
made” or for the court to allow withdrawal of the plea if the prosecutor was 
going to “recommend prison.” R938:339–51, 357, 370, 381–85, 433, 439–51, 
455, 458–60, 488–98, 506, 510, 514–16. 
 Harper was represented by new counsel at sentencing (sentencing 
counsel), and she argued for probation. As part of that argument, she pointed 
to the language of the plea agreement about a 402 reduction. R938:736. 
Stating that she had “no idea how an argument could be made that this didn’t 
agree to probation,” Harper’s sentencing counsel asserted that such language 
“would never be part of a potential prison sentence recommendation,” or at 
least would be a “very confusing” way to word an agreement that allowed 
for a prison recommendation. R938:736. Still, his sentencing counsel did not 
argue that the prosecutor was bound to recommend probation or that the 
prosecutor breached any such agreement, nor did she ask the court to 
reconsider its denial of Harper’s motion to withdraw his plea.  
 The prosecutor argued for imprisonment. R938:751–52. The court 
imposed a 1 to 15-year sentence. R938:549–50.4 
 
4 This sentence was imposed at the same hearing in which the court 
revoked Harper’s probation on the first case. R938:549–50. 
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Appeal of the Second Case 
 Harper timely appealed from the final order in his second case, with 
the appellate case designated as 20180024-CA. R938:571, 575.5 Upon Harper’s 
motion, this Court consolidated this appeal with his second appeal of the first 
case (20180250-CA), with the consolidated appellate case designated as 
20180024-CA. R036:639. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 As an initial matter, Harper argues that this Court must sever the 
appeals in the first and second cases, presumably because he believes there is 
a jurisdictional defect in the appeal of the first case. While the Court may 
sever the cases, doing so is not necessary. There is no jurisdictional defect in 
the first case, and Harper has abandoned his challenge in that case anyway. 
The Court need only affirm. 
 In the second case, Harper argues for the first time on appeal that the 
plea agreement included a promise that the prosecutor would recommend 
probation and the prosecutor was required to fulfill that promise. Harper 
claims that the breach rendered the plea unknowing and involuntary. 
 
5 Harper had earlier filed a notice of appeal from a non-final order in 
the second case, with the appellate case designated as 20170662-CA. 
R938:355, 590. This Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 
R938:590–91. That earlier appeal is not at issue here. 
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Alternatively, Harper argues that he was misled into understanding that the 
prosecutor would recommend probation, and that if the prosecutor never 
intended to do so, Harper pleaded guilty without understanding the actual 
value of the bargain he made. Finally, Harper argues that if there was no 
promise to recommend probation, his plea counsel was ineffective for not 
objecting to the prosecutor’s contrary, “false” statement in the plea agreement 
and demanding during the plea colloquy that the prosecutor correct or clarify 
it. 
 This Court does not have jurisdiction over any of the challenges in 
Harper’s second case. As this Court held in State v. Badikyan, a timely motion 
to withdraw a guilty plea is insufficient to confer appellate jurisdiction over 
challenges that are not raised in the motion. All of Harper’s appellate 
challenges are new. His trial motion focused on his own mental condition and 
his misunderstanding that he was guaranteed probation, based on the 
language of the plea agreement and his plea counsel’s assurances. Harper 
never alerted the district court to his argument that he thought he was 
entitled to a probation recommendation from the State. And he never presented 
any evidence about what he believed the prosecutor had promised to do. 
Finally, Harper essentially concedes that he did not raise his claim that his 
-13- 
plea counsel should have demanded that the prosecutor clarify or correct the 
statements in the plea agreement. 
 But if this Court concludes that Harper preserved his challenges, it 
should reject them because Harper did not present evidence to prove that his 
plea was unknowing or involuntary. No evidence establishes that the 
prosecutor promised to recommend probation, and the prosecutor’s proffer 
directly refutes any assertion of such a promise. Harper had the burden to 
prove his claim, and he failed to do so. 
 Furthermore, even if there were a promise to recommend probation, at 
most that would entitle Harper to resentencing before a different judge where 
the prosecutor makes the recommendation. But even so, the State would be 
excused from performing that obligation because Harper’s subsequent 
criminal activity amounted to a breach of an implied promise to not change 
the circumstances under which the parties reached their agreement. 
 The evidence is also insufficient to show that Harper was genuinely 
and legitimately misled by the language in the plea agreement. On the record 
Harper created below, Harper cannot show an abuse of discretion in the 
district court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his plea. 
 Finally, if this Court has jurisdiction over Harper’s ineffective-




Any jurisdictional defect in either appeal affects only 
that appeal; this Court has jurisdiction in the first case 
and should affirm because Harper has abandoned his 
appellate challenge. 
 Harper suggests that this Court should vacate its order consolidating 
the appeals in the first and second cases.6 Br.Aplt.5. Harper seems to imply 
that doing so is necessary “in order for this Court to separately rule” on the 
merits of his appeal in the second case. Br.Aplt.5. The logic of Harper’s 
argument seems to be that (1) this Court dismissed Harper’s first appeal in 
the first case for lack of jurisdiction; (2) that jurisdictional ruling “is 
controlling” in the second appeal of the first case; and (3) any jurisdictional 
defect in the first case necessarily infects the second case as well. Br.Aplt.5. 
 This Court may vacate its consolidation order, but doing so is not 
necessary to reach the merits of either the first or second appeal. There is no 
jurisdictional defect in the first case. Harper’s second appeal of the first case—
which he now abandons—is jurisdictionally distinct from his first appeal of 
 
6 Although Harper’s brief says he “moves to vacate the prior order of 
consolidation,” Harper has not filed a motion to vacate. Br.Aplt.5. But that 
would not prevent the Court from doing so on its own motion. 
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the first case. But even if there were a jurisdictional defect in his first case, it 
could not affect this Court’s authority to rule on the issues in the second case. 
 In the first appeal of the first case, this Court dismissed for lack of 
jurisdiction under the Plea Withdrawal Statute, Utah Code §77-13-6, because 
Harper challenged the validity of his guilty plea on appeal but he had not 
filed a timely motion to withdraw his guilty plea in the first case. R036:396–
97. 
 Harper’s second appeal in the first case does not challenge the validity 
of his guilty plea. Rather, it ostensibly challenges the probation revocation in 
the first case. Br.Aplt.5. This Court would have jurisdiction to address any 
post-plea orders that Harper challenges in his first case, including the 
revocation of his probation. See NPEC LLC v. Miller, 2018 UT App 85, ¶¶4–10, 
427 P.3d 357 (per curiam) (concluding that law of the case barred 
consideration of issues in second appeal that did not “challenge actions 
occurring after the dismissal of his first appeal”); State v. Scott, 2017 UT App 
103, ¶¶8–9, 400 P.3d 1172 (concluding that court had jurisdiction to address 
sentence but not guilty plea).  
 But Harper has now withdrawn his challenge to the district court’s 
probation revocation in the first case. Br.Aplt.5. He concedes that the 
probation revocation “cannot be legitimately deemed to be legally 
-16- 
unreasonable or excessive under governing law.” Br.Aplt.5. Where Harper 
has abandoned his challenge to the probation revocation, the proper ruling 
in the first case is not dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, but affirmance. 
 Even so, any possible jurisdictional problem in the first case does not 
require severing the two cases on appeal. Any preclusive effect that this 
Court’s prior dismissal had can at most affect the first case. Consolidation on 
appeal does not erase the distinct identities of multiple cases. See Pulham v. 
Kirsling, 2019 UT 18, ¶¶22, 45, 443 P.3d 1217 (analyzing limits on appellate 
jurisdiction over one appeal separate from substantive issues in second 
consolidated appeal); State v. Earl, 2015 UT 12, ¶13, 345 P.3d 1153 (affirming 
“the decisions in both of the consolidated cases” and remanding for further 
consideration). Just as the jurisdictional limits of the Plea Withdrawal Statute 
are applied to specific issues raised within one case and not necessarily the 
entire case, see Scott, 2017 UT App 103, ¶¶8–9, any jurisdictional defect in the 
first case based on the Plea Withdrawal Statute cannot reach the second case, 
even if the two are consolidated for purposes of appeal. 
 Although this Court lacks jurisdiction over the appeal in the second 
case, as argued below in Point II, the jurisdictional defect in Harper’s appeal 
does not stem from this Court’s earlier order in the first case. Because this 
Court has jurisdiction over the second appeal from the first case, and because 
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Harper has withdrawn his challenge to the district court’s probation 
revocation, this Court should simply affirm the district court’s order in the 
first case. 
II. 
This Court does not have appellate jurisdiction over 
Harper’s challenges to his guilty plea in the second 
case because the appeal involves new challenges not 
raised in his motion to withdraw. 
 Harper presents two arguments in his appeal on the second case. First, 
he argues that the prosecutor either agreed to recommend probation and 
breached that promise; or he misrepresented that he would recommend 
probation, leading Harper to miscalculate the value of the State’s concessions 
and thus rendering his plea unknowing or involuntary. Br.Aplt.3, 6–15, 17–
24. Second, Harper argues that—if the prosecutor had not promised to 
recommend probation—Harper’s plea counsel was ineffective for not 
demanding at the plea colloquy that the prosecutor clarify or correct the 
“false” statement in the plea agreement that he would recommend probation. 
Br.Aplt.3, 15–16, 23–29. 
 Neither challenge is preserved, and under the Plea Withdrawal Statute, 
this Court lacks jurisdiction over challenges to a guilty plea that are not raised 
before sentence is announced. This Court has applied that rule even when a 
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defendant timely moves to withdraw his guilty plea but, like Harper, 
challenges the plea on grounds that differ from those raised on appeal.  
 In State v. Rettig, 2017 UT 83, 416 P.3d 520, the supreme court held that 
the Plea Withdrawal Statute imposes “both a rule of preservation and a 
jurisdictional bar on appellate consideration of matters not properly preserved.”  
Id. ¶27 (second emphasis added). If the matter is not properly preserved, 
appellate courts lack jurisdiction to consider it, even through plain-error 
review or an ineffective-assistance challenge. Id. ¶¶27, 44, 47–51, 61. And in 
State v. Allgier, 2017 UT 84, 416 P.3d 546, the supreme court explained that the 
Plea Withdrawal Statute’s rule of preservation requires a challenge to be 
specifically raised. Id. ¶25. It “require[s] that an issue be ‘presented to the trial 
court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that 
issue.’” Id. The test is not just whether a motion was timely, but “whether an 
issue was specifically raised in the district court in a timely fashion and 
whether evidence or relevant legal authority was introduced to address the 
issue.” Id. “The Plea Withdrawal Statute requires a defendant to take each of 
these steps to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest.” Id. 
 Although Rettig and Allgier involved appellate review where there was 
no valid motion to withdraw the pleas, this Court held in State v. Badikyan, 
2018 UT App 168, 436 P.3d 256, cert. granted, 437 P.3d 1247, that under Rettig 
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and Allgier a timely motion is not sufficient to grant appellate jurisdiction 
over challenges not raised in that motion. Badikyan, 2018 UT App 168, ¶¶18–
22; see also Utah Code Ann. §77-13-6(2)(c) (West 2017) (“Any challenge to a 
guilty plea not made within the time period specified in Subsection (2)(b) 
shall be pursued under Title 78B, Chapter 9, Postconviction Remedies Act, 
and Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.” (emphasis added)). 
 Although Harper timely moved to withdraw his plea, he did not 
challenge his plea on the bases he now raises. In his motion, Harper argued 
that he did not “appreciate[e] the full consequences of his guilty plea” for two 
reasons: he was emotionally unstable because he faced the prospect of losing 
custody of his son, and his attorney advised him that he would get probation 
if he pleaded guilty. R938:307, 309. Harper thus claimed that he “did not 
know” that he “could be sent to prison.” R938:309. He cited cases in his 
motion discussing mental condition and its effect on voluntariness. R938:306–
07.  
 Harper never argued in his motion or during oral argument on that 
motion that the plea agreement actually contained an enforceable agreement 
that the prosecutor would recommend probation. R938:306–07, 631–40.  
During oral argument, Harper’s withdrawal counsel did argue that the 
language of the plea agreement suggested that a non-attorney would have 
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understood the plea agreement to mean that “the State is agreeing that he will 
receive probation.” R938:631–32 (emphasis added). But he used that language 
to reinforce his argument that Harper’s plea counsel misled him, particularly 
in light of Harper’s mental state at the time. R938:631–33, 639.  
 And Harper’s withdrawal counsel phrased the argument in terms of 
Harper thinking he was guaranteed probation—not in terms of a promised 
recommendation that the sentencing court had discretion to disregard. See 
R938:631 (acknowledging that “we understand” that the court had discretion 
in sentencing but arguing that “the problem is … that he was informed by his 
attorney … that he would get probation if he pled” (emphasis added)); R938:632 
(“[T]he State is agreeing that he will receive probation.” (emphasis added)); 
R938:632 (“And he was relying on his attorney’s representation that he will be 
given probation.” (emphasis added)); R938:632 “[Y]ou wouldn’t put down a 
two-step reduction if he complies with probation if there wasn’t certainly an 
inference it was expected that he would get probation.” (emphasis added)); 
R938:632 (“[W]hat was in his mind at the time … was the representation by 
this attorney that in exchange for pleading … you will get probation … .” 
(emphasis added)); R938:639 (“[H]e was entering a plea based on the 
statement that he would get probation.” (emphasis added)). 
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 The district court naturally understood these repeated references as an 
argument that Harper thought he was guaranteed probation. It rejected 
Harper’s argument, stating that it did not understand why Harper “would 
think he had a guarantee of probation” when the court told him otherwise 
during the plea colloquy and Harper reiterated at the time that he 
understood. R938:639. The court also stated that disliking a sentencing 
recommendation was not a valid basis for withdrawal of a plea. R938:638.  
 A guarantee of probation is not the same thing as a promise that the 
prosecutor would recommend probation. Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure provides an avenue for parties to commit the court to a 
particular sentence. After reaching a tentative agreement, the parties may 
disclose that agreement to the court before entry of a plea. Utah R. Crim. 
P. 11(i)(2). “The judge may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and 
defense counsel whether the proposed disposition will be approved.” Id. And 
if the judge later changes her mind, she must give the defendant a chance to 
withdraw his plea. Utah R. Crim. P. 11(i)(3). That process is wholly distinct 
from a typical sentencing recommendation, which the court is not bound to 
accept. Utah R. Crim. P. 11(h)(2). 
 If Harper was really arguing that the prosecutor had promised to 
recommend probation, or that Harper was misled into thinking he had, 
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Harper did not present that argument “in such a way that the trial court ha[d] 
an opportunity to rule on that issue.’” Allgier, 2017 UT 84, ¶25. Harper never 
asked for an evidentiary hearing to create a record of what the prosecutor 
promised. He never proffered his own testimony or his plea counsel’s 
testimony that they understood the prosecutor had promised to recommend 
probation. He never requested a ruling interpreting the language of the plea 
agreement or making findings about the reasonable expectations of the 
parties about what the State promised to do. He never cited any cases dealing 
with the interpretation of plea agreements, breach of plea agreements, or 
whether a defendant understood the value of the promises made to him. And 
on appeal, Harper never tries to challenge the district court’s finding on the 
claim he presented below—that Harper was guaranteed probation or at least 
thought that he was.  
 Because no “evidence or relevant legal authority was introduced to 
address the issue” Harper raises on appeal, he did not preserve his challenge. 
Allgier, 2017 UT 84, ¶25; see also Salt Lake City v. Josephson, 2019 UT 6, ¶12, 435 
P.3d 255 (“The party must put forth enough evidence that ‘the issue [is] 
sufficiently raised to a level of consciousness before the trial court.’” 
(alteration in original)).  
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 Harper’s failure to preserve is even clearer on his second challenge—
that his plea counsel was ineffective for not insisting during the plea colloquy 
that the prosecutor correct the statement in the plea agreement. Harper never 
raised this objection below. Indeed, Harper effectively concedes that he did 
not preserve this claim, arguing it through the lens of ineffective assistance. 
Br.Aplt.1. 3, 24–29. But under Badikyan, Harper’s concession means this Court 
has no jurisdiction to consider the new appellate challenge even under an 
ineffective-assistance rubric. Badikyan, 2018 UT App 168, ¶¶18–22.  
Harper does make passing references in his appellate brief to this claim 
as if it were preserved. Br.Aplt.15, 23. But he cites no place in the record where 
this issue was preserved and presents it in his issue statement as an 
unpreserved claim. Br.Aplt.1–2. Harper’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea 
and his arguments on that motion never addressed allegedly false statements 
by the prosecutor or argued that the prosecutor was required to correct any 
false statements. 
 Because Harper did not preserve the challenges to his plea that he now 
raises on appeal, this Court lacks jurisdiction. Allgier, 2017 UT 84, ¶25; Rettig, 
2017 UT 83, ¶¶26–27; Badikyan, 2018 UT App 168, ¶¶18–22. This Court should 
therefore dismiss the appeal in the second case for lack of jurisdiction.  
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III. 
If this Court has jurisdiction over Harper’s second 
case, it should affirm because Harper has failed to 
carry his burden of proving that his plea was 
unknowing or involuntary.  
 If the Court agrees that Harper’s appellate challenges are not 
preserved, then under Badikyan it cannot address them even for plain error or 
ineffective assistance. If, however, the Court believes that Harper’s challenge 
below was sufficient to give the district court an opportunity to rule on the 
issues he now asks this Court to address, then this Court may address them 
on their merits. But even if this Court gets to the merits, Harper’s arguments 
for withdrawing the plea lack record support.7 
 
7 The supreme court granted a writ of certiorari to review Badikyan. But 
“‘[t]he fact that certiorari was granted ... does not deprive [the opinion] of 
precedential value.’” Estrada v. Mendoza, 2012 UT App 82, ¶7 n.4, 275 P.3d 
1024 (omission and second alteration in original). In the event that the 
supreme court were to overturn Badikyan before this Court disposes of 
Harper’s appeal, that may allow this Court to reach unpreserved challenges 
to Harper’s guilty plea through plain error or ineffective assistance. But apart 
from his claim that his plea counsel should have insisted on the prosecutor 
correcting the plea statement, Harper has not presented any justification for 
reaching his unpreserved challenges. Harper would not be entitled to review 
of his other challenges even for plain error or ineffective assistance. See, e.g., 
State v. Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61, ¶21, 167 P.3d 1046 (refusing to consider 
unpreserved issue when appellant did not brief any justification for reaching 
it).  
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 A defendant may withdraw a guilty plea only on “a showing that it 
was not knowingly and voluntarily made.” Utah Code Ann. §77-13-6(2)(a). 
Harper argues that his plea was unknowing and involuntary for two 
alternative reasons. First, he argues that the plea agreement obligated the 
prosecutor to recommend probation, and the prosecutor’s prison 
recommendation breached the agreement and rendered Harper’s plea 
unknowing or involuntary. Br.Aplt.11, 16. Second, Harper argues that at the 
very least, the language in the plea agreement misled him into thinking the 
prosecutor had promised to recommend probation, thus causing Harper to 
misunderstand the value of the plea bargain. Br.Aplt. 3, 9–13, 16–24. 
 The record does not support either of Harper’s alternative claims. It 
was Harper’s burden to prove that his plea was unknowing or involuntary. 
Any deficiency in the record must be held against Harper. First, Harper did 
not establish that the prosecutor agreed to recommend probation. But even if 
it did, Harper would not be entitled to withdraw his plea—at most he would 
 
For the same reason, this Court need not stay this case or certify it to 
the supreme court pending that court’s disposition of Badikyan. Either Harper 
sufficiently presented his claims and this Court may reach them, or he did 
not and he has forfeited them by not arguing plain error or ineffective 
assistance. (As for Harper’s single ineffective-assistance claim, it is 
inadequately briefed, as demonstrated in Point IV below, and thus does not 
present the kind of significant issue that justifies certification.) 
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be entitled to resentencing, though even that remedy is unavailable because 
Harper’s continuing criminal conduct excused the prosecutor from any 
obligation to recommend probation. Second, Harper did not establish that he 
was misled into thinking the prosecutor had promised to recommend 
probation. He presented no evidence of any misrepresentation and no 
evidence that Harper actually thought the prosecutor had promised to 
recommend probation. 
 But if this Court disagrees and believes that there is some evidence to 
support Harper’s position, the most it can do is remand for the district court 
to make credibility and other findings to resolve any conflict in the evidence. 
A. The record does not demonstrate that the prosecutor promised 
to recommend probation; in any event, the prosecutor’s prison 
recommendation would not entitle Harper to withdrawal of 
his plea. 
 Harper repeatedly refers in his brief to an “agreement for probation.” 
Br.Aplt.10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15. The State interprets this as an argument that the 
prosecutor agreed to recommend probation. Harper argues that “the State 
was obligated to keep its word,” and that its failure to do so entitles Harper 
to withdraw his plea. Br.Aplt.11, 16. 
But Harper assumes that the plea agreement contains a promise that 
the prosecutor would recommend probation. He has never proved that key 
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fact. In any event, he would not be entitled to withdraw his plea even if the 
prosecutor had promised to recommend probation. 
1. Harper did not prove that the plea agreement contained a 
promise to recommend probation. 
 Harper relies on the language of the plea agreement to argue that the 
prosecutor agreed to recommend probation. But the language is ambiguous, 
so Harper must rely on extrinsic evidence to interpret the agreement. Because 
Harper presented no extrinsic evidence to the district court that could have 
established that key point, this Court must affirm. 
 The plea statement says, “The State agrees to a two-step 76-3-402 
reduction if I comply 100% with all terms and conditions of AP&P 
probation.” R938:160. Harper points out that the language does not say that 
“‘if he gets probation’” the State will recommend a two-step reduction. 
Br.Aplt.10. But Harper glosses over something else the language does not say: 
The plea statement does not say that the State will recommend probation. It 
does not even use Harper’s more amorphous phrase, “agree[] to probation.” 
Br.Aplt.10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15.8 
 
8 Even if the plea statement had used the phrase “agree to probation,” 
that could mean five different things: agree to have the court commit to a 
sentence of probation under rule 11(i); agree to recommend probation; agree 
to not oppose Harper’s request for probation; agree to not oppose a probation 
recommendation from AP&P; or agree to recommend probation if AP&P 
recommended probation. 
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 Because there is no express agreement to recommend probation, 
Harper’s argument must depend on an implied promise to recommend 
probation. But it is at least equally valid to read the promise to be no more 
than that the State would agree to a two-step reduction if the court had 
decided to grant probation.9 
 
If Harper means an agreement to seek to commit the court, he has not 
challenged the district court’s finding that Harper had no guarantee of 
probation and that Harper understood he had no guarantee. Any such claim 
thus fails at the outset. See, e.g., State v. Clopten, 2015 UT 82, ¶45, 362 P.3d 1216 
(refusing to address argument where defendant asked the appellate court “to 
review a decision the trial court did not make” but “failed to challenge the 
decision the trial court did make”). Such a claim would also fail because 
Harper has not explained why his after-the-fact declaration should be enough 
to overcome the “‘strong presumption of verity’” given to his “‘[s]olemn 
declaration in open court’” that he understood the court was free to sentence 
him to prison. See Arriaga v. State, 2018 UT App 160, ¶15, 436 P.3d 222, cert. 
granted, 437 P.3d 1247 (Utah 2019); accord State v. Archuleta, 2019 UT App 136, 
¶20, --- P.3d ----. 
        
 
. If Harper means an 
agreement to not oppose Harper’s request for probation, the analysis in this 
case would functionally be no different than if dealing with an agreement to 
affirmatively recommend probation. 
9 The reference to a two-step reduction does not by itself establish that 
the prosecutor was committed to probation as opposed to prison. The statute 
allows for a two-step reduction even for defendants sentenced to prison. Utah 
Code Ann. §76-3-402(1), (3) (West 2015). The plea statement thus makes one 
thing clear: If the court decided to sentence Harper to prison, the prosecutor 
was not obligated to agree to a two-step reduction. 
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Harper tries to buttress his interpretation of the language by arguing 
that it “makes no sense” for the prosecutor to agree to release Harper pending 
sentencing if the prosecutor’s “true intentions” were to argue for a prison 
sentence. Br.Aplt.10. But there is nothing inconsistent with the prosecutor 
agreeing to release pending sentencing but not binding himself to 
recommend probation. In fact, that course is imminently reasonable. Harper’s 
release gave Harper an opportunity to prove that he was a good candidate 
for probation—a test that Harper ultimately failed when he assaulted his 
probation officers while on release. Thus, the provision recommending 
release pending sentencing does nothing to remove the ambiguity in the plea 
agreement. Both interpretations are reasonable. 
 “Plea agreements are generally interpreted using principles of contract 
law.”10 State v. Samul, 2018 UT App 177, ¶14, 436 P.3d 298. “[A] contractual 
term or provision is ambiguous if ‘it is capable of more than one reasonable 
interpretation because of uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms, or 
other facial deficiencies.’” Brady v. Park, 2019 UT 16, ¶54, --- P.3d ----. 
“[W]here a contractual term or provision is ambiguous as to what the parties 
 
10 There is “no constitutional right to plea bargain.” Weatherford v. 
Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 561 (1977). But if a prosecutor chooses to offer one, and 
a defendant accepts it by pleading guilty, the parties ”essentially” have a 
contract. Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 137 (2009). 
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intended, the question becomes a question of fact to be determined by the 
fact-finder” “by considering extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent.” Id. ¶53. 
Thus, “[t]he underlying purpose in construing a contract is to ascertain the 
intentions of the parties and to identify what the parties reasonably 
understood to be the terms of the agreement.” State v. Terrazas, 2014 UT App 
229, ¶27, 336 P.3d 594 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 This Court has noted that ambiguities in plea agreements are construed 
against the government. Samul, 2018 UT App 177, ¶13 n.2. That rule 
represents a modification of the basic interpretive rule of contracts that 
ambiguities are to be construed against the drafter. See State v. Patience, 944 
P.2d 381, 387 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (noting that there are some “limits to the 
contract analogy,” including “‘holding the government to a greater degree of 
responsibility than the defendant ... for imprecisions or ambiguities in plea 
agreements’”). But construing a contract against the drafter—or, in the case 
of a plea agreement, against the State—is a tie-breaker rule that is to be 
applied only after looking to extrinsic evidence to ascertain the parties’ intent. 
See Brady, 2019 UT 16, ¶56 (“In the rare case where the extrinsic evidence 
‘does not reveal the intent of the parties,’ a district court should then, and 
only then, ‘resolve the ambiguity against the drafter.’” (footnote omitted)); 
Wilburn v. Interstate Elec., 748 P.2d 582, 585–86 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (“[T]he 
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doctrine of construing ambiguities in a contract against the drafter functions 
as a kind of tie-breaker, used as a last resort by the fact-finder after the receipt 
and consideration of all pertinent extrinsic evidence has left unresolved what 
the parties actually intended.”). Otherwise, courts risk overriding the actual 
intent of the parties. 
 Harper does not point to any relevant extrinsic evidence. Indeed, he 
presented none below. He argues that this Court should simply accept his 
“unopposed affidavit.” Br.Aplt.24. But Harper’s declaration says nothing 
about whether the prosecutor promised to recommend probation. Instead, he 
said only that he “thought that I would be placed on probation,” that his plea 
counsel “told me I’ll get probation,” that Harper “did not know that by 
pleading guilty, I could be sent to prison,” and that Harper “did not know 
that AP&P would recommend prison.” R938:309.  
Nothing in that proffer says that either Harper or his plea counsel 
understood the language of the plea statement to contain a promise that the 
prosecutor would recommend probation. In fact, it suggests the opposite.  
Harper proffers that he understood that he would actually get probation. But 
a promise to merely recommend probation necessarily includes the 
possibility that Harper would not get it—precisely the opposite of what 
Harper declared he understood the agreement to be. 
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 In fact, the prosecutor proffered at the hearing on Harper’s motion to 
withdraw his plea that “we never talked about probation being agreed 
upon.” R938:635. The prosecutor added that if there had been an agreement 
for probation, “[i]t would have been in the plea form that we agree that he 
gets probation and a 402 [reduction] upon successful completion.” R938:635 
(emphasis added). So the only proffer of relevant extrinsic evidence in the 
record defeats Harper’s claim.  
 Perhaps recognizing that no extrinsic evidence supports his 
interpretation of the plea agreement, Harper faults the State for having 
“neglected to have [Harper’s plea counsel] testify” about the plea 
negotiations. Br.Aplt.24. But Harper bore the burden of proving that his plea 
was unknowing or involuntary, so any record deficiency must be held against 
Harper, not the State. State v. Ruiz, 2012 UT 29, ¶¶36–37, 282 P.3d 998 (“[O]n 
a presentence motion to withdraw, the burden of proof is on the defendant, 
who must show that his or her plea was not knowingly and voluntarily 
made.”); see also State v. Archuleta, 2019 UT App 136, ¶23, --- P.3d ---- 
(concluding that defendant failed to meet his burden when he presented no 
“‘objective evidence’”—only “‘self-serving statements’” that were 
contradicted by his statements during plea colloquy); State v. Powell, 2015 UT 
App 250, ¶¶6–8, 361 P.3d 143 (concluding defendant failed to meet his 
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burden when evidence he presented was “thin, at best” and was contradicted 
by other evidence in the record); State v. Collins, 2015 UT App 214, ¶9, 359 
P.3d 664 (concluding that defendant fell “far short of carrying his burden” 
when he pointed to evidence that he was confused about the details of his 
plea during his plea withdrawal hearing, but no evidence that he was 
confused at the time he entered his plea). 
 When the party that has the burden of proof in the district court fails 
to put on evidence to support his claim, this Court must affirm the denial of 
the claim. See State v. Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, ¶11, 76 P.3d 1159 (stating that 
remand for further factual development is inappropriate where party with 
burden of proof has failed to put on evidence to meet that burden); State v. 
Hechtle, 2004 UT App 96, ¶17 n.4, 89 P.3d 185 (same). See also State v. Alexander, 
2012 UT 27, ¶¶68–69, 279 P.3d 371 (Lee, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part) (stating that lack of evidence supporting motion to withdraw plea 
should be resolved against defendant, who bears burden of proof). But see 
Alexander, 2012 UT 27, ¶55 (majority opinion) (concluding that “record 
nonetheless demonstrates that Mr. Alexander’s plea was not knowingly and 
voluntarily made”). 
 Harper does not rely on the many letters and pro se motions he 
submitted to the court to establish the meaning of the plea agreement. But 
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even if he had, it would be insufficient. After the court denied Harper’s 
motion to withdraw his plea, Harper told the court in several letters and pro 
se filings that the prosecutor made “a deal for probation.” See, e.g., R938:339. 
But these documents do not constitute record evidence. “When a defendant 
is represented by counsel, he generally has no authority to file pro se motions, 
and the court should not consider them.” State v. Wareham, 2006 UT App 327, 
¶33, 143 P.3d 302 (internal quotation marks omitted); accord State v. Finlayson, 
2014 UT App 282, ¶21 n.10, 362 P.3d 926. 
 In any event, “a deal for probation” is not necessarily an agreement to 
recommend probation. If anything, it is more consistent with Harper’s 
declaration—that he understood that he had a deal that would guarantee 
probation. See Utah R. Crim. P. 11(i). But the district court found that Harper 
had no guarantee of probation and that he understood as much. R938:639.  
 Further, Harper was represented by new counsel during sentencing. 
His sentencing counsel was aware of these letters and was aware that Harper 
wanted the district court to reconsider its denial of his motion to withdraw 
his plea. R938:685–87, 734, 753. Yet his sentencing counsel chose not to file a 
motion to reconsider or to present any additional evidence to the court. And 
although she argued that the language of the plea agreement suggested an 
agreement for probation or was at least “very confusing,” Harper’s 
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sentencing counsel never argued that the prosecutor’s prison 
recommendation breached the plea agreement and entitled Harper to some 
remedy. R938:736. Harper has not argued that his sentencing counsel was 
ineffective. Given the “strong presumption” of reasonable representation, 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984), this Court should assume 
that Harper’s sentencing counsel could find no factual basis to support a 
claim that the prosecutor actually promised to recommend probation. The 
best she could do on this point was appeal to the confusing language to argue 
for leniency. 
 In short, the language of the plea agreement is ambiguous. It does not 
state that the prosecutor will recommend probation and can reasonably be 
read as containing no such implicit promise. Because it is ambiguous, Harper 
had to present extrinsic evidence to the district court to establish that the plea 
agreement contained a promise to recommend probation. He did not. 
Because he failed to prove that the plea agreement contained a promise to 
recommend probation, he has failed to prove that the prosecutor breached 
any promise by recommending prison. 
2. Even if the prosecutor promised to recommend probation, 
Harper would not be entitled to withdraw his plea. 
 But even if Harper had made the necessary factual showing below, he 
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is not entitled to withdraw his plea on this basis for two reasons. First, for any 
breach of a plea agreement, Harper is entitled only to specific performance—
resentencing before a different judge where the prosecutor makes the 
promised recommendation. Second, Harper is not even entitled to specific 
performance because his subsequent criminal activity excused the prosecutor 
from any obligation to recommend probation—Harper’s subsequent criminal 
activity hindered the government and breached an implied promise not to 
change the circumstances that formed a basis of the agreement. 
a. Withdrawal of a guilty plea is not available as a remedy 
for any breach of a plea agreement.  
 The State’s breach of any agreement entitles Harper only to specific 
performance, not withdrawal of his plea. When a defendant pleads guilty in 
exchange for a sentencing recommendation, the prosecutor’s promise “must 
be fulfilled.” Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971). Agreeing to 
recommend one thing but instead recommending another amounts to a 
breach of the plea agreement. See id. at 258–59. 
 If there is a breach and the defendant objects, the United States 
Supreme Court has held that state trial courts have the discretion to choose 
between two remedies based upon the circumstances of the case: (1) plea 
withdrawal; or (2) specific performance—that is, resentencing in front of a 
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different judge at which the prosecutor makes the agreed-upon 
recommendation.  Id. at 263. 
 Though the Supreme Court held that the Constitution affords 
defendants a remedy when a prosecutor breaches the sentencing promise, the 
Court did not specify that they have a right to a particular remedy. In practice, 
resentencing is preferred by far. 21 Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law §§655–56 
(Westlaw 2014) (citing cases). And the Supreme Court has never prohibited 
the states from regulating those remedies. In Utah, the legislature has limited 
the availability of plea withdrawal to situations where the plea was 
unknowing and involuntary. Utah Code Ann. §77-13-6(2)(a); Alexander, 2012 
UT 27, ¶23. 
 Breach of a plea agreement does not render a plea unknowing or 
involuntary. Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 137–38 (2009). As the 
Supreme Court explained, “it is entirely clear that a breach does not cause the 
guilty plea, when entered, to have been unknowing or involuntary. It is 
precisely because the plea was knowing and voluntary (and hence valid) that 
the Government is obligated to uphold its side of the bargain.” Id. And 
because breach cannot render a plea unknowing or involuntary, breach 
cannot serve a basis for withdrawal of the plea under Utah law. See Utah 
Code Ann. §77-13-6(2)(a). 
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 This Court has held that trial courts have discretion to choose the 
remedy for a breach of a plea agreement. State v. Smit, 2004 UT App 222, ¶¶9–
17, 95 P.3d 1203 (applying Santobello). But it reached that conclusion in a case 
that was governed by a prior version of the Plea Withdrawal Statute, which 
allowed for withdrawal upon a showing of good cause. See Utah Code of 
Criminal Procedure Amendments, ch. 290, §1, 2003 Utah Laws 1321 
(amending Utah Code §77-13-6, effective May 5, 2003, to change the required 
showing for withdrawing a plea from good cause to unknowing and 
involuntary); Smit, 2004 UT App 222, ¶4 (indicating that Smit’s sentencing 
took place in 2002). It also reached that conclusion before the United States 
Supreme Court clarified that a breach of a plea agreement does not render a 
plea unknowing or involuntary. See Puckett, 556 U.S. at 137–38 & n.1 
(disavowing, in 2009, prior cases that suggested a breach would render a plea 
unknowing or involuntary). And more recently, this Court has held that 
when a defendant alleges breach of a plea agreement but fails to comply with 
the requirements of the Plea Withdrawal Statute, “the only alternative 
remedy available” is specific performance, not withdrawal. State v. Saenz, 
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2016 UT App 95, ¶7, 373 P.3d 220 (addressing scenario where breach was 
alleged in untimely motion to withdraw plea).11 
 If the prosecutor promised to recommend probation, then at most 
Harper is entitled to resentencing before a different judge where the State 
recommends probation. Harper never asked for this remedy from the district 
court, and he does not ask for this remedy on appeal. 
b. The State was excused from any obligation to 
recommend probation because of Harper’s subsequent 
criminal activity. 
 Even so, Harper is not entitled to resentencing because the State is 
excused from any obligation to recommend probation due to Harper’s assault 
of his probation officers between the plea hearing and sentencing. 
 Harper claims that even “If”12 he committed a new offense after the 
plea agreement, the prosecutor was obligated to honor his promise or “undo 
 
11 After holding in Saenz that the Plea Withdrawal Statute limits the 
trial court’s discretion to choose between remedies for a breach, the Court in 
a subsequent case repeated the general principle that trial courts have 
discretion to choose the remedy. See State v. Samul, 2018 UT App 177, ¶17, 436 
P.3d 298. But that reference was dicta and should be disavowed to the extent 
it conflicts with Saenz, the Plea Withdrawal Statute, and United States 
Supreme Court precedent. 
12 Harper refuses to acknowledge that he did commit a new offense 
after pleading guilty. Br.Aplt.10, 16. Yet Harper admitted to the district court 
that he violated his probation in the first case by committing attempted 
assault by a prisoner. R036:480, 714, 720–21. 
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or modify the plea.” Br.Aplt.16. He argues that any response to a new offense 
had to be pursued in a separate proceeding because the plea agreement said 
nothing about allowing the prosecutor to “change its mind if situation XYZ 
arises.” Br.Aplt.16. 
 Harper cites no authority for his argument that any subsequent 
criminal activity has no bearing on the State’s obligations in the plea 
agreement. In fact, substantial authority supports the opposite position: 
Subsequent criminal activity excuses the State from any obligation to 
recommend probation.  
 “[W]hen a defendant, as a result of ‘plea bargaining,’ enters a plea of 
guilty in exchange for the prosecutor’s promise to recommend probation, 
there is an implied promise by the defendant that the circumstances under 
which the bargain was made will remain substantially the same.” State v. 
Pascall, 358 N.E.2d 1368, 1369 (Ohio Ct. App. 1972). “The commission of a 
crime subsequent to entering a plea agreement and before sentencing is a 
change in circumstances amounting to a breach of that implied promise and 
is sufficient to excuse the state from fulfilling its promised recommendation.” 
State v. Tyler, 84 P.3d 567, 570 (Idaho Ct. App. 2003). “To require the 
prosecutor to fulfill his promise, or to permit the defendant to withdraw his 
plea, would, in effect, reward the defendant for his unlawful conduct.” 
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Pascall, 358 N.E.2d at 1369. See also United States v. Delacruz, 144 F.3d 492, 494–
95 (7th Cir. 1998) (excusing prosecutor from sentencing recommendation 
because defendant breached plea agreement by fleeing jurisdiction and 
engaging in further criminal conduct); State v. Corwin, 93 P.3d 745, 2004 WL 
1609124 at *1–2 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004) (per curiam) (unpublished) (excusing 
prosecutor from sentencing recommendation because defendant committed 
additional felonies after pleading guilty); In re A.R.E.G., 543 N.E.2d 589, 589–
91 (Ill. Ct. App. 1989) (excusing prosecutor from obligation to recommend 
lighter disposition because juvenile engaged in additional delinquent 
behavior between adjudication and disposition). Cf. Patience, 944 P.2d at 387 
(stating that defendant’s breach of plea agreement authorizes state to rescind 
plea agreement). 
 It does not matter that the defendant’s obligation is implied rather than 
express. United States v. Hallahan, 756 F.3d 962, 973 (7th Cir. 2014); United 
States v. David, 58 F.3d 113, 115 (4th Cir. 1995); Tyler, 84 P.3d at 570; Pascall, 
358 N.E.2d at 1369. And when a defendant breaches a plea agreement, he is 
not entitled to withdraw from that agreement. Hallahan, 756 F.3d at 973; 
United States v. Gregory, 245 F.3d 160, 165–66 (2d Cir. 2001); Pascall, 358 N.E.2d 
at 1369. But see State v. Zuniga, 2002 WI App 233, ¶11, 652 N.W.2d 423 
(rejecting excuse analysis and concluding that proper remedy under 
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Wisconsin law is vacating plea agreement and guilty plea). “‘[A] classic rule 
of contract law, is that a party should be prevented from benefitting from its 
own breach.’” Hallahan, 756 F.3d at 973 (alteration in original). “Otherwise, a 
party would have the power to escape an unwanted contractual obligation 
simply by breaching another provision of the contract under which it arises.” 
Id.  
 Although most courts view this problem through the lens of changed 
circumstances, hindrance provides another basis for excusing the State from 
recommending probation. “[E]very contract contains an implied condition 
that each party will not unjustifiably hinder the other from performing.” 
23 Williston on Contracts §63:26 (4th ed.). The United States Supreme Court 
recognized the potential applicability of this doctrine to cases like this. In 
Puckett v. United States, the government agreed to argue for a three-level 
sentencing reduction based on acceptance of responsibility. Puckett, 556 U.S. 
at 131. But when Puckett committed another crime before sentencing, the 
government opposed any sentencing reduction. Id. at 132. Although the 
government conceded on appeal that it had breached the plea agreement, the 
Court noted that an argument that “ongoing criminal conduct hindered 
performance … might have convinced us had it been pressed.” Id. at 140 n.2. 
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 When the State recommends probation, it implicitly warrants to the 
district court that the defendant is an appropriate candidate for probation. 
When the defendant commits further criminal activity after the State agrees 
to recommend probation and before sentencing, the defendant has 
unjustifiably and substantially hindered the State’s ability to fulfill its 
obligation. At the very least, the defendant has breached the agreement by 
changing the circumstances in a material way, fundamentally altering a key 
consideration that the State’s promise was based on—the defendant’s 
criminal history and risk assessment. When Harper assaulted his probation 
officers after pleading guilty in the second case, the State was excused from 
recommending probation in the second case—to the extent it ever promised 
to do so. 
C. Harper has not proven that he was misled into genuinely and 
legitimately thinking the prosecutor had promised to 
recommend probation.  
 Harper argues that even if the prosecutor had not promised to 
recommend probation, the language in the plea agreement misled Harper 
into thinking the prosecutor had, thus causing Harper to misunderstand the 
value of the plea bargain. Br.Aplt. 3, 9–13, 16–24. 
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 Again, Harper has failed to point to any evidence that could establish 
his claim that the prosecutor misled Harper into thinking the prosecutor had 
promised to recommend probation. 
 To be voluntary, a plea must be entered “without undue influence, 
coercion, or improper inducement.” State v. Forsyth, 560 P.2d 337, 338–39 
(Utah 1977). Thus, a defendant may establish that a plea was involuntary if it 
was induced by a “‘misrepresentation’” that “at the time of contracting” the 
prosecutor intended not to perform. Puckett, 556 U.S. at 138 n.1. 
 To be knowing, a plea must be made “with sufficient awareness of the 
relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” Brady v. United States, 397 
U.S. 742, 748 (1970). The attendant circumstances and likely consequences of 
which the defendant must be aware include “‘the actual value of any 
commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel.’” Id. 
at 755.13 
 
13 Courts and litigants often use knowing and voluntary interchangeably. 
See, e.g., United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002). While there may be 
some overlap in the concepts, knowingness generally relates to the facts and 
law of which a defendant must be aware to intelligently plead. See Bousley v. 
United States, 523 U.S. 614, 618 (1998). On the other hand, voluntariness refers 
to the requirement that the plea not be the product of state coercion or 
improper inducement. Forsyth, 560 P.2d at 338–39. 
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 Thus, a defendant may establish that his plea was unknowing if “he 
was misinformed as to the true nature of the charge against him” or other 
attendant circumstances or likely consequences of his plea, see Bousley v. 
United States, 523 U.S. 614, 619 (1998) (emphasis added), and as a result the 
defendant was “genuinely and legitimately confused,” State v. Copeland, 765 
P.2d 1266, 1274–75 (Utah 1988).14 “If a prosecutor makes misstatements and 
the defendant relies upon the misstatements, a substantial question arises as 
to whether [the d]efendant knowingly and voluntarily entered into a plea.” 
State v. Magness, 2017 UT App 130, ¶22, 402 P.3d 105.  
 For example, in Magness, this Court held that the defendant was 
entitled to withdraw his plea where the prosecutor promised to recommend 
probation as long as the victim did not ask for a prison sentence, and the 
prosecutor mistakenly said at the time of the plea that the victim did not at 
that time plan to ask for a prison sentence. Id. ¶¶7, 25–28. 
 But this Court also cautioned that if the defendant “simply 
miscalculated the likelihood” of a certain outcome without any misstatement 
 
14 A showing that the defendant was misled or misinformed may not 
always be required to show that a plea was unknowing. See Copeland, 765 P.2d 
at 1274–76. But Harper has based his claim that he did not understand the 
true value of the plea agreement solely on the premise that he was misled. 
Br.Aplt.6–24. 
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by the prosecutor that induced that miscalculation, “a basis for withdrawing 
the guilty plea would likely not exist.” Id. ¶29. When a defendant has been 
informed of the likely consequences and the commitments made, and then 
with the assistance of counsel decides to plead guilty, it is not enough to show 
that the defendant miscalculated or misjudged the likelihood of a particular 
sentence. See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 630–31 (2002); Bousley, 523 
U.S. at 619; Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 797–98 (1970); McMann v. 
Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 769–71 (1970); Brady, 397 U.S. at 756–57.  
 “[T]he decision to plead guilty before the evidence is in frequently 
involves the making of difficult judgments.” McMann, 397 U.S. at 769. “[T]he 
Constitution … does not require complete knowledge of the relevant 
circumstances, but permits a court to accept a guilty plea … despite various 
forms of misapprehension under which a defendant might labor.” Ruiz, 536 
U.S. at 630. Thus, a defendant cannot show that his plea was unknowing 
when he “did not correctly assess every relevant factor entering into his 
decision,” or when “his calculus misapprehended … the likely penalties 
attached to alternative courses of action.” Brady, 397 U.S. at 756–57. “[A] mere 
subjective belief of a defendant as to potential sentence, or hope of leniency, 
unsupported by any promise from the prosecutor or indication by the court, is 
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insufficient to invalidate a guilty plea as involuntary or unknowing.” State v. 
Garfield, 552 P.2d 129, 131 (Utah 1976) (emphasis added). 
 Harper argues that he was misled by the written plea agreement. 
Br.Aplt.3, 9–13, 16–24. He does not argue that he was misled by the court or 
by defense counsel.15 And he does not point to anything other than the 
written plea agreement as the source of any misinformation. Rather, he claims 
that the prosecutor made a “false” promise, promising to recommend 
probation while his “true intentions” were always to argue for imprisonment. 
See Br.Aplt.3, 9–13. He thus argues that he was “misled” into pleading guilty 
by the prosecutor’s “bait-and-switch,” making his plea involuntary. 
Br.Aplt.11, 13. He also appears to argue that even if the prosecutor did not 
lie, the statement in the plea agreement was still misleading and caused 
Harper to miscalculate the value of the bargain he had received, thus making 
his plea unknowing. Br.Aplt.16–24. 
 Harper has pointed to no evidence to support his allegations that the 
prosecutor intentionally misled him. The allegations are baseless. This Court 
should reject out of hand any claim that Harper’s plea was induced by a 
promise that the prosecutor had no intention of keeping. 
 
15 Harper argued below that his counsel misled him. R938:307, 309. But 
he has abandoned any such claim on appeal. 
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 To the extent Harper also argues that the prosecutor misled him—
inadvertently or unintentionally—by the wording of the plea agreement, 
Harper has not proven that Harper was genuinely and legitimately misled by 
any such misstatement. 
 Even assuming that the ambiguity in the statement, coupled with the 
prosecutor’s proffer that there was no agreement for probation, were enough 
to establish that the prosecutor misstated his intent by agreeing to the 
language in the plea agreement, Harper also had to prove that he was 
“genuinely and legitimately confused” about the terms of the agreement as a 
result. Copeland, 765 P.2d at 1274–75. Harper proffered nothing below to 
establish that he actually thought the prosecutor had agreed to recommend 
probation. As discussed, Harper’s declaration stated that he thought he 
would be placed on probation and that his plea counsel told him as much. 
But Harper never declared that he believed the prosecutor had promised to 
recommend probation. During the hearing, his withdrawal counsel never 
proffered anything to indicate that Harper genuinely and legitimately 
believed the prosecutor had agreed to recommend probation. And for the 
reasons stated in Point III.A.1 above, Harper’s letters and pro se motions are 
insufficient to establish that he genuinely and legitimately believed the 
prosecutor had promised to recommend probation. If those documents and 
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the facts behind them supported a finding that Harper’s plea was 
unknowing, Harper’s sentencing counsel would have asked the court to 
reconsider its ruling.16 
 Harper has not pointed to any evidence to show that his expectation 
that he would get probation for pleading guilty was anything other than an 
ordinary “misapprehension” of the likelihood of a particular outcome. Ruiz, 
536 U.S. at 630. Harper and his plea counsel “simply miscalculated the 
likelihood” of probation, without any misrepresentation by the prosecutor. 
Magness, 2017 UT App 130, ¶29. That is not enough to prove that his plea was 
unknowing or involuntary. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 630–31; Bousley, 523 U.S. at 619; 
Parker, 397 U.S. at 797–98; McMann, 397 U.S. at 769–71; Brady, 397 U.S. at 756–
57. 
 In short, Harper did not create a record below to show that the 
prosecutor misled him and that Harper genuinely and legitimately, but 
mistakenly, believed the prosecutor had agreed to recommend probation. 
Because Harper did not meet his burden below, this Court should affirm. 
 
16 As explained above, the letters and motions refer to an agreement or 
deal for probation. If Harper meant that he thought the parties had agreed to 
ask the court to commit itself to a probation sentence through rule 11(i), the 
district court’s unchallenged finding that Harper understood he was not 
guaranteed probation forecloses that argument.  
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D. At most, Harper would be entitled to a remand for further fact 
findings. 
 If this Court believes there is some evidence to support either a claim 
that the plea agreement contained an enforceable promise to recommend 
probation, or the prosecutor misled Harper into thinking as much, this Court 
may at most remand for further fact findings by the district court.17 
 If there is any evidence to support Harper’s challenges, it does not cut 
solely in his favor. The prosecutor proffered that there was no agreement for 
probation. R938:635. And as shown, there is no existing proffer to support 
Harper’s assertions that there was a promise to recommend probation.  Even 
Harper’s repeated references in his letters and pro se motions to an agreement 
for probation—which could mean several different things—are suspect. That 
proffer was made after the court denied Harper’s motion to withdraw. Cf. Lee 
v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958, 1967 (2017) (“Courts should not upset a plea 
solely because of post hoc assertions from a defendant about how he would 
have pleaded but for his attorney’s deficiencies. Judges should instead look 
 
17 If this Court believes that remand is necessary, and if it also agrees 
with the State that the prosecutor was excused from any promise to 
recommend probation, then the Court should limit any remand to the 
question of whether Harper was genuinely and legitimately misled by the 
language in the plea agreement. 
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to contemporaneous evidence to substantiate a defendant’s expressed 
preferences.”).  
So the best Harper could hope for is a remand to take evidence on 
whether there was an agreement that the prosecutor would recommend 
probation or whether Harper genuinely and legitimately thought there was 
as a result of the language in the plea agreement. That may very well require 
resolving conflicting evidence, including determining witness credibility. 
“[I]t is not the function of an appellate court to make findings of fact because 
it does not have the advantage of seeing and hearing witnesses testify.” 
Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1979). As noted, when a contract 
is ambiguous, “the question becomes a question of fact to be determined by the 
fact-finder.” Brady, 2019 UT 16, ¶53 (emphasis added).  
 Because the district court has yet to hear evidence on what the parties 
agreed to or thought they agreed to, and has yet to make fact findings on the 
key issues in this case, this Court may not reverse and direct the district court 
to allow Harper to withdraw his plea; at most the Court may remand for the 
district court to make the required findings. See Copeland, 765 P.2d at 1273–76 
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(remanding for findings on plea withdrawal motion); Garfield, 552 P.2d at 
130–31 (same).18 
IV. 
If this Court has jurisdiction over Harper’s ineffective-
assistance claim, it should reject the claim as 
inadequately briefed. 
 Harper argues that if the prosecutor never promised to recommend 
probation, he was required to correct the contrary, “false” statement in the 
plea agreement and that Harper’s plea counsel was ineffective for not 
demanding at the plea colloquy that the prosecutor do so. Br.Aplt.15, 23–29.19 
 Harper has not adequately briefed his claim. He does not explain how 
his plea counsel was deficient or how any deficient performance prejudiced 
him. Nor has he made a record sufficient to establish ineffective assistance. 
 
18 The State maintains that the district court did not make findings 
because Harper never asked it to and never offered the requisite evidence to 
support the arguments he now makes—thus illustrating the lack of 
preservation that deprives this Court of jurisdiction. Alternatively, the State 
contends that the district court did not make findings because Harper did not 
carry his burden of presenting relevant evidence to allow the court to do so. 
Only if this Court disagrees with both positions should it remand for further 
findings and credibility determinations. 
19 This Court cannot, consistent with Badikyan, address the merits of an 
ineffective-assistance claim raising a challenge not raised in Harper’s motion 
to withdraw his guilty plea. Supra Point II. However, the State addresses 
Harper’s ineffective-assistance claim out of an abundance of caution. The 
Court may reach this claim only if the supreme court were to overrule 
Badikyan while this case is pending. See Estrada, 2012 UT App 82, ¶7 n.4 
(stating that cert. grant does not deprive case of precedential value). 
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To prove that his plea counsel was ineffective, Harper must prove both 
that his plea counsel performed deficiently and that he was prejudiced as a 
result. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–89, 694 (1984). This is a 
“heavy burden,” id. at 687–89, and “never an easy task,” Padilla v. Kentucky, 
559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010). 
Deficient performance requires proof that Harper’s plea counsel’s 
representation “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88. Counsel is always “strongly presumed to have 
rendered adequate assistance.” Id. at 690. To show otherwise, Harper must 
prove that “no competent attorney” would have proceeded as his plea 
counsel did. Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 124 (2011). To show prejudice, 
Harper must show that there is “a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 
Harper does not explain how his plea counsel was deficient. Harper 
argues that the prosecutor was obligated to correct any misstatements in the 
plea agreement, and Harper cites Napue v. People of State of Illinois, 360 U.S. 
264 (1959), in support. Br.Aplt.15, 23–29. In Napue, the Supreme Court held 
that the State must correct “false evidence” when it appears. 360 U.S. at 269. 
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Although Harper spends several pages in his brief explaining why the 
prosecutor supposedly violated Napue, Harper gives scant treatment to the 
controlling issue on appeal—why his plea counsel was deficient for not 
raising the issue. Harper concludes that his plea counsel “rendered 
ineffective and deficient performance when he failed to point out and/or 
clarify the lack of probation representation in the plea form to the court and 
the prosecution.” Br.Aplt.27–28. But a single sentence asserting that counsel 
was deficient for not raising the issue is inadequate to carry Harper’s burden 
of proof on appeal. “This is merely rephrasing that which must ultimately be 
shown to satisfy the … the Strickland test … .” Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 
877 (Utah 1993). That “is clearly insufficient to affirmatively demonstrate” 
deficient performance. See id.; see also State v. Roberts, 2015 UT 24 ¶18, 345 P.3d 
1226 (stating that an appellant who does not support his argument with 
authority or analysis will ordinarily fail to meet his burden). 
The question on appeal is not whether the prosecutor violated Napue, 
but whether all reasonable attorneys would have recognized and raised a 
Napue claim. See McMann, 397 U.S. at 770–71 (deficient performance analysis 
turns “not on whether a court would retrospectively consider counsel’s 
advice to be right or wrong, but on whether that advice was within the range 
of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases”); State v. Vallejo, 2019 
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UT 38, ¶¶69–70 & n.13, --- P.3d ---- (addressing whether counsel’s 
performance was reasonable without addressing whether objection would 
have succeeded). Harper has done nothing to meet that standard.  
For example, Harper has not explained why all reasonable attorneys 
would have recognized the statement in the plea agreement as a “false 
statement.” As explained in Point III.A.1 above, the statement in the plea 
agreement can reasonably be read as not promising to recommend probation. 
If a reasonable attorney could interpret the statement that way, then counsel 
could reasonably decide there was no false statement to correct. “The 
presence of ambiguity defeats [Harper’s] argument that his counsel was 
ineffective.” Samul, 2018 UT App 177, ¶¶15–16 (rejecting claim that counsel 
was ineffective for not alleging breach of plea agreement, because plea 
agreement was ambiguous). 
But even if every reasonable attorney would have read the statement 
as promising to recommend probation, Harper has pointed to no record 
evidence to explain how his plea counsel, or any other reasonable attorney, 
would have known “at the time of the plea” that it was false—that the 
prosecutor did not intend to recommend probation. Br.Aplt.15. If the written 
plea agreement is read the way Harper insists, then the soonest any of 
Harper’s counsel would have become aware that the prosecutor did not 
-56- 
intend to recommend probation would have been at the hearing on the 
motion to withdraw the plea, where the prosecutor stated that there was no 
agreement on probation. But by that point, the prosecutor had corrected any 
“false statement” by clarifying that there was no agreement on probation. 
R938:635. In other words, the prosecutor did exactly what Harper argues his 
plea counsel should have asked him to do, and at the soonest point that this 
record establishes that a reasonable attorney would have been alerted to the 
issue.20 
Harper’s prejudice argument is similarly truncated. Although he 
quotes extensively from Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958 (2017), to 
demonstrate how prejudice should be analyzed in a plea context, he baldly 
asserts that “[h]ad prior counsel appropriately clarified the State’s lack of 
probation recommendation in the plea agreement, … Harper would not have 
pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Br.Aplt.29. Again, 
 
20 To the extent Harper argues that the prosecutor intended to 
recommend probation, that the language of the plea statement is “false” in 
that it does not contain a promise to recommend probation, and that his plea 
counsel should have asked the prosecutor to clarify the language to add a 
promise to recommend probation, see Br.Aplt.28, Harper has not shown that 
the record established the predicate fact that the prosecutor ever intended to 
recommend probation. 
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this is “merely rephrasing that which must ultimately be shown to satisfy the 
second prong of the Strickland test.” Fernandez, 870 P.2d at 877.  
Harper’s declaration never states that he would have insisted on going 
to trial if only he knew that the prosecutor was not recommending probation. 
That is fatal to his claim. “[I]n order to satisfy the ‘prejudice’ requirement, the 
defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted 
on going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).  
His argument as to why he would have insisted on going to trial cannot 
substitute for a proffer that he in fact would have so insisted. See id. at 60 
(rejecting petitioner’s claim because he did not allege in his petition for 
habeas relief that he would have rejected plea and insisted on trial had 
counsel given him correct advice). But in any event, Harper’s argument 
(elsewhere in his brief) as to why it would have made sense for him to insist 
on going to trial is contradicted by the record. Harper suggests that getting 
probation was “a determinative factor” in deciding to plead guilty. 
Br.Aplt.12. He thus analogizes to Lee, where the Supreme Court held that a 
defendant was able to show that going to trial would have been a rational 
choice because avoiding deportation “was the determinative factor for him” 
and trial gave him a slightly better chance of that. 137 S. Ct. at 1967–69. But 
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the question here is whether getting a recommendation for probation was the 
determinative factor. If actually getting probation was the determinative 
factor, as Harper suggests, then a promise that the prosecutor would merely 
recommend probation would not have been enough to induce Harper to 
plead guilty because the court could easily reject the recommendation.  
Further, the record does not clearly establish that getting a promise to 
recommend probation—or even actually getting probation—was the 
determinative factor for Harper. Although his declaration states that he did 
not know that he could be sent to prison by pleading guilty, he also identified 
other considerations: his plea counsel allegedly told him he would “never see 
[his] son again unless [he] plead[ed],” and during the plea colloquy Harper 
said he wanted to plead because he wanted to be released from custody 
immediately, which was part of the plea agreement. R938:160, 309, 595. And 
although Harper’s withdrawal counsel referred to Harper pleading “as 
charged,” R938:631–32, a criminal trespass charge was dismissed as part of 
the plea agreement, R938:160. Harper cannot show on this record that getting 
a probation recommendation from the State was the determinative factor and 
that he would have insisted on going to trial if his plea counsel had clarified 
that the prosecutor was not promising to recommend probation. See Hill, 474 
U.S. at 60 (rejecting petitioner’s challenge to plea when he “alleged no special 
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circumstances that might support the conclusion that he placed particular 
emphasis on [the subject matter of his counsel’s bad advice] in deciding 
whether or not to plead guilty”). 
 Because this Court lacks jurisdiction over Harper’s ineffective-
assistance claim, because Harper has inadequately briefed his claim, and 
because he has not created a record to support his claim, this Court should 
dismiss the claim—even if it remands for factual development on Harper’s 
other claims. Harper had the chance to create a record below. He had the 
chance to file a motion for remand under rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. He should not get two bites at the apple. 
CONCLUSION 
 This Court should affirm the first case because Harper has withdrawn 
his claim of error on appeal. The Court should dismiss the second case for 
lack of jurisdiction because Harper raises new challenges to his guilty plea on 
appeal. But if this Court concludes that it has jurisdiction, it should affirm 
because Harper failed to prove that his plea was unknowing or involuntary. 
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Statutes and Rules 

Utah Code Section 77-13-6. Withdrawal of plea (West 2017) 
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction. 
(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon leave of the 
court and a showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made. 
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest, except for a plea held 
in abeyance, shall be made by motion before sentence is announced. Sentence 
may not be announced unless the motion is denied. For a plea held in 
abeyance, a motion to withdraw the plea shall be made within 30 days of 
pleading guilty or no contest. 
(c) Any challenge to a guilty plea not made within the time period specified in 
Subsection (2)(b) shall be pursued under Title 78B, Chapter 9, Postconviction 
Remedies Act, and Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 

Utah R. Crim. P. 11. Pleas (2016) 
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be represented 
by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court. The defendant 
shall not be required to plead until the defendant has had a reasonable time to 
confer with counsel. 
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by reason of 
insanity, or guilty and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the alternative not 
guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a defendant refuses to plead or if a 
defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not guilty. 
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court. 
( d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be set 
for trial. A defendant unable to make bail shall be given a preference for an early 
trial. In cases other than felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or counsel, 
of the requirements for making a written demand for a jury trial. 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and 
mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found: 
(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly 
waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel; 
(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the 
right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial 
before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court 
the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense 
witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are waived; 
(4) (A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to 
which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the 
burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and 
that the plea is an admission of all those elements; 
(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it 
establishes that the charged crime was actually committed by the 
defendant or, if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit 
culpability, that the prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a 
substantial risk of conviction; 
(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if 
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that 
may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including the 
possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences; 
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea 
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached; 
(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to 
withdraw the plea; and 
(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited. 
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record or, if 
used, a written statement reciting these factors after the court has established that 
the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the 
statement. If the defendant cannot understand the English language, it will be 
sufficient that the statement has been read or translated to the defendant. 
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to inquire 
into or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea. 
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to 
withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground 
for setting the plea aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to make 
a motion under Section 77-13-6. 
(g) If the defendant pleads guilty, no contest, or guilty and mentally ill to a 
misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, as defined in Utah Code Section 77-36-
1, the court shall advise the defendant orally or in writing that, as a result of the 
plea, it is unlawful for the defendant to possess, receive or transport any firearm 
or ammunition. The failure to advise does not render the plea invalid or form the 
basis for withdrawal of the plea. 
(h) (1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has agreed to 
request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included offense, or 
the dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be approved or rejected by 
the court. 
(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court shall 
advise the defendant personally that any recommendation as to sentence is 
not binding on the court. 
(i) (1) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any plea 
agreement being made by the prosecuting attorney. 
(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, upon 
request of the parties, may permit the disclosure of the tentative agreement 
and the reasons for it, in advance of the time for tender of the plea. The judge 
may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel whether 
the proposed disposition will be approved. 
(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in conformity 
with the plea agreement, the judge shall advise the defendant and then call 
upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw the plea. 
(j) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a defendant 
may enter a conditional plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no contest, 
reserving in the record the right, on appeal from the judgment, to a review of the 
adverse determination of any specified pre-trial motion. A defendant who 
prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea. 
(k) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill, in addition to the 
other requirements of this rule, the court shall hold a hearing within a reasonable 
time to determine if the defendant is mentally ill in accordance with Utah Code 
Ann.§ 77-16a-103. 
(I) Compliance with this rule shall be determined by examining the record as a 
whole. Any variance from the procedures required by this rule which does not 
affect substantial rights shall be disregarded. Failure to comply with this rule is 
not, by itself, sufficient grounds for a collateral attack on a guilty plea. 

Addendum B 
Sentence, Judgment, Commitment 
(R938:549-50) 

The Order of the Court is stated below: 
Dated: December 22, 2017 KAtAtThleEd,k~.1e.,t!Jij'.1f.~l\.\ •. " 
05:09: 19 PM /s/ .ot ~ 
GOOQt,l .,\ \ 
District. . !e. I 
by '\~.)~_>:X::·:./ _,'_;~~{_/-'.~ 
Is! KATIE J()'HNS0N 
District Cou1t Clerk 
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STA.TE OF UTAH 
MINUTES STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, SENTENCE, cTTIDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
vs. Case No: 161911938 FS 
ERNEST CLAYTON HARPER, 
Defendant. 
Judge: KATIE BERNARDS-GOODMAN 
Custody: Salt Lake County Jail 
PRESENT 
Clerk: katiej 
Prosecutor: DEESING, ANDREW K 
Defendant Present 
Date: December 21, 2017 
The defendant is in the custody of the Salt Lake County Jail 
Defendant's Attorney(sl: CARAM TANGARO 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: October 27, 1971 
Sheriff Office#: 294536 
Audio 
Tape Number: W43 Tape Count: 1017-1136 
This case involves domestic violence. 
CHARGES 
l. STALKING - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 04/14/2017 Guilty 
2. CRIMINAL TRESPASS - Class B Misdemeanor 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 04/14/2017 Dismissed w/ Prejudi 
HEARING 
Defendant transported from ADC. Defense addresses the Court regarding a resolution of 
all cases. Defendant enters an admission to allegation 2 in the affidavit. Defense 
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Case No: 161911938 Date: Dec 21, 2017 
addresses the Court regarding the status of case 151908678 and order to show cause in 
case 131401036 and gives argument on the guilty plea being enters as to a lesser charge 
on 161911938. State argues for guilty plea to the current charge. 
10:38 AM 
Ms. Lorie Hobbs, attorney for victim, addresses the Court regarding 131401036 and gives 
a brief history. 
10:48 AM 
All parties discuss the history of the cases. Victims address the court. 
11:36 AM 
***The Court hereby orders defendant to serve 0-365 days jail with the option to serve 
at the Utah State Prison on case 151908678 and 171907138, 1-15 years at the Utah State 
Prison on case 161911938 and 0-5 years at the Utah State Prison on case 131401036 all 
to run concurrent to each other. The Court recommends the defendant receive credit for 
283 days time served.*** 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of STALKING a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is 
sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen 
years in the Utah State Prison. 
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately. 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your custody for 
transportation to the Utah State Prison where the defendant will be confined. 
End Of Order - Signature at the Top of the First Page 
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August 11, 2017 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
* * * 
MR. BAUTISTA: Can you address the Ernest Harper 
THE COURT: No. 58, State of Utah versus Ernest 
7 Clayton Harper [inaudible] 
8 All right. I have all the motions that have been 
9 filed regarding Mr. Harper's case, the motion to withdraw his 
10 plea and the State's response. 
11 MR. BAUTISTA: Your Honor, and in response to the 
12 State, the most concerning issue in this matter is if you look 
13 at the statement of defendant that was filled out by 
14 Mr. Peterson signed by the State and in view part of the record 
15 [inaudible] guilty plea. It indicates in there that the State 
16 agrees to a two-step 76-3--402 reduction if I 100 percent if 
17 I comply 100 percent with all terms and conditions of AP&P 
18 probation. All we have here is we understand that sentencing 
19 is for the Court's determination and discretion. 
20 But the problem is is that he was informed by his 
21 attorney to the courts that he was told that he would get 
22 probation if he pled as charged. He did plead as charged. And 
23 the problem is if you read the statement of defendant, it 
24 clearly would imply to someone, especially not legally trained, 
25 that the State is agreeing to a 402 -- two-step 402 reduction 
3 
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1 as long as he complies with all the conditions of probation and 
2 advised the State is agreeing- that he will receive probation. 
3 .AJ1d that's the problem here. 
4 We understand that at the time he entered his plea, 
5 that the Court did inquire with him and made sure that he 
6 understood that you decided the sentence. And he did it and 
7 replied that he did at that time. 
8 In his affidavit he purports that he was so stressed 
9 out and so much under tension to get out of jail to take care 
10 of his son that he was concerned about that he in essence was 
11 willing to agree to anything. And he was relying on his 
12 attorney's representation that he will be given probation. 
13 And in light of the statement of defendant that was 
14 signed by the defendant, written by his lawyer, you wouldn't 
15 put down a two-step reduction if he complies with probation if 
16 there wa.sn' t certainly an inference it was expected that he 
17 would get probation. 
18 If it had said if he's given the privilege of, 
19 probation or the State agrees to a two--step if he's given 
20 probation, that "if" language, unfortunately the language in 
21 there signed by Mr. Peterson and the State doesn't have an 
22 "if". And so since he's a lay person, and what we are trying 
23 to do is go through what was in his mind at the time, his mind 
24 at the time was the representation by this attorney that in 
25 exchan9e for pleading as charged, you will get probation and he 
4 
00632 
1 accepted that deal. And he was also told that he would be 
2 released pending .sentencing. That part was complied with at 
3 the time. 
4 So what we're asking the Court is notwithstanding the 
5 colloquy that was inside the court is to understand that he was 
6 under such duress and anguish. And AP&P has -- has documented 
7 that they are aware that he has either more health issues or 
8 serious personality disorder issues that have arisen from being 
9 a victim of crimes himself. 
10 In light of the mental state that he was in at that 
11 time, of having wanting to get out of custody to take care 
12 of his son, the representations of his attorney supported by 
13 inference by the statement in it, we're asking the Court to 
14 allow him to withdraw his plea because it wasn't knowing and 
15 voluntarily done at the time in his mind. And so we'd submit 
16 it. 
THE COURT: The State's response'? 17 
18 MR. DEESING: Arid Judge, we've briefed this fairly 
19 extensively. I delivered a copy to Your Honor's chambers 
20 yesterday, and wee-filed, I think, at some point yesterday. 
21 Attached to that is the transcript of the hearing. Admittedly, 
22 it's not an official transcript. It's one that we did 
23 internally within our office. 
24 But if we look at the transcript of what actually 
25 occurred at the time he plead guilty, none of what :Mr. Bautista 
5 
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1 has represented seems to be backed up by this transcript. And 
2 I'm referring to the defendant's statement where after, after 
3 this -- after we told the Court that, look, this isn't 
4 something that appears that it's going to work, he clearly is 
5 minimizing his action -- and I'm on page 2 of the transcript --
6 he says, "Your Honor, rigt1t now I'm extremely nervous because I 
7 realize that the penalty of this could put me in prison and I'm 
8 obviously not trying to go that -- go there. I do realize 
9 that, Your Honor." 
10 So if he'd been promised probation by his attorney in 
11 the back, why in the world would he come up here thinking that 
12 he was going to go to prison? It doesn't make any sense. 
13 And this knowing and voluntary is very clear. It 
14 doesn't mean that he gets to come here today and say, look, I 
15 have PTSD, which when the AP&P officers who supervised him 
16 testified last week at the hearing for his assault on those two 
17 officers, when they took him into custody, neither one of those 
18 officers were aware of any sort of diagnosis form or otherwise. 
19 So what he's provided to the Court is some sort of 
20 documentation from some sort of social worker at the jail that 
21 has somehow diagnosed him with PTSD. I'm not entirely sure how 
22 they do that or if they are even qualified to be doing that, 
23 but it's certainly not something that this court should be 
24 looking at when we're looking at whether or not the plea was 
25 knowing and voluntary. 
6 
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1 If you listen to the hearing, and Your Honor was 
2 there, it's a very clear Rule 11 colloquy. Not only do we back 
3 up and say, look, we can give you a trial date on the 25th, 
4 he -- you then give him another opportunity, because it was so 
5 abundantly obvious that he wanted to plead guilty. And you had 
6 told him, "You just can't plead guilty to get out of jail." If 
7 you look at the transcript, we withdrew that recommendation 
8 prior to completing whereas we are no longer recommending that. 
9 So even hearing that, that we're no longer 
10 recommending that he be released, he still asks to plead 
11 guilty. 
12 So what -- what's in the plea form we see all the 
13 time. That if I'm given probation, it's a 402 reduction. 
14 That's fine. It's fairly cornrnon language. 
15 We don't have testimony from Mr. Peterson, and I 
16 suppose we could wait and have him testify. I doubt he 
17 remembers exactly what was said back there because it just 
18 doesn't seem like he's going to remember an exact conversation. 
19 But I can represent that we never talked about probation being 
20 agreed upon. It would have been in the plea form that we agree 
21 that he gets probation and a 402 upon successful completion. 
22 So we'd ask the Court to deny his motion to withdraw 
23 his guilty plea and sentence him today. 
24 MR. BAUTISTA: The problem is, Your Honor, is that 
25 the plea form doesn't say, "If he gets probation." It says he 
7 
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1 will get a two-step 402 reduction if he complies with 
2 probation. That kind of 
3 THE COURT: He understood that prison was a 
4 possibility. I told him I could sentence that and he said this 





MR. BAUTISTA: He understands that. 
THE COURT: But I told him not to plead just to get 
MR. BAUTISTA: Understand. But it's -- his -- his 
10 testimony by affidavit is that that, that was not his 
11 understanding at the time. That he was -- he was telling me 
12 what -- what needed to be done to get out of custody, take care 
13 of his son, and that he was -- and he wouldn't -- he hadn't a 
14 problem with the plea if AP&P had recommended probation. But 
1 C. ,..) 
16 
17 
where the recommendation of prison and the State recomt1ending 
pri.son, it's made him get in a position where he's realized the 
mistakes that were entered upon and he was -- he's purporting 
18 that he was misled into that. And that's the problem we have. 
19 In addition, his supervising agent, Agent 
20 Sutterfield, testified that he wasn't aware that his actual 
21 mental health diagnosis, whether it was bipolar, schizophrenic 
22 or such, but that he was aware that he had no health issues. 
23 A..nd so they were -- A..P&P was aware that there are issues there. 
24 Just he wasn't aware of the actual diagnosis. 
25 THE COURT: Okay. My concern is you have evidence, 
8 
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1 an affidavit from him, if we don't have testimony from 
2 Mr. Peterson 
3 MR. DEESING: Wt1at we have is the hearing, Judge. 
4 And the case law is pretty clear that this decision is very 
5 much in the district court's hands. It 1 s up to you as to 
6 whether or not you feel that the Rule 11 colloquy was --- was 
7 appropriately given. And when we look at the case law on that 
8 Rule 11 colloquy, what the Supreme Court has said is when you 
9 go through Rule 11, most of these issues are foreclosed, 
10 because we've walked through all of this. So you've asked him 
11 all these questions. 
12 The issue today is whether he understood the charges, 
13 which when we look at the transcript, it's abundantly clear 
14 that he understood them. He, in fact, explains the charges to 
15 you, which through his minimization of the charges, that's what 
16 leads us this down a bad path to begin with. He said, "Yeah, I 
17 understand that sometimes you can call somebody a jerk." He 
18 goes through that whole conversation. 
19 So he understands his constitutional rights. You 
20 walked him through every one. Mr. Peterson walks him through 
21 everyone. We know that from the affidavit and the likely 
22 conseei'"L1ences of the plea. We have that in his own words. 
23 So I didn 1 t subpoena 1'1r. Peterson because we really 
24 don't need to know what's in Mr. Peterson's head because we 
25 have the transcript of the very hearing where the defendant 
00637 
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1 clearly understands what's going on. If this was a standard 
2 hearing where he just .simply said yes or no to all of your 
3 questions, yeah, it may have been a little bit different 
4 situation. We rnay have had to have his attorney come and 
5 testify. Here, he is elaborating on the very rights that he 
6 needs -- that you need to explain to him. 
7 THE COURT: Well, I find it very difficult to think 
8 that ~tr. Peterson would have ever told him that there wasn't a 
9 possibility of prison and that what the sentence was would be 
10 up to the judge. I told him as well. I tried to get him to 
11 slow down and back up, to not do this just to get out and to 
12 understand that prison was a potential here. 
13 .i'md then we have a motion to withdraw the plea, which 
14 comes only after he finds out he has a prison recommendation, 
15 which is not a legitimate reason to withdraw a plea when you 
16 don't like the recommendation for the .sentence. So I'm going 
17 to deny his motion to withdraw. 
18 MR. BAUTISTA: If I may clarify a couple of points, 
19 Your Honor. He has informed me that he actually conveyed to 
20 Mr. Peterson prior to the presentence report when he was taken 
21 back in custody by AP&P, that he wanted to withdraw his plea at 
22 that time prior to it. 
23 In addition, the concern I have with the State's 
24 position is if the standard is if Rule 11 has been complied 
25 with, then we are done, then the standard of whether his plea 
10 
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1 was knowing and voluntarily made is disingenuous. If Rule 11 
2 is a blanket protection; therefore, it was complied with before 
3 his plea must have been knowing and voluntarily done, then 
4 he -- to say that you have the right to petition for -- to 
5 withdraw your plea if you can show you did not do it knowing 
6 and voluntarily has no weight. It's a meaningless protection. 
7 The concern here is that in essence he waived his 
8 constitutional rights. He waived a right to a trial and to not 
9 plead guilty, and he pled guilty as charged presumably for 
10 something in return. It's not normal for defendants to enter 
11 guilty pleas as charged with no consideration. 
12 And the problem is the statement of defendant does 
13 say, it doesn't .say "if". Arid so that supports hi.s position 
14 that it was -- that he was entering a plea based on the 
15 statement that he would get probation. 
16 In addition, by withdrawing his plea, it doesn't make 
17 him a free man, it just puts him back in the position 
18 beforehand, and the State can still proceed and prove him 
19 guilty beyond a reasonable doubt if they can do so. 
20 THE COURT: Well, I don't understand why he would 
21 think he had a guarantee of probation when I told him you have 
22 the potential for one to 15 years at the Utah Prison, a $10,000 
23 fine with a 98 percent surcharge, something less may be 
24 recommended but I could sentence to that max1rnum if I choose. 
25 Do you understand that? And he sa_j_d, 11 I do, ma' am." 
11 
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1 He also himself volunteered that he knew that this 
2 could put him in prison. To say now that he didn't understand 
3 prison was a possibility, I just find it difficult to believe. 
4 I see no reason to allow withdrawal of this plea at this time. 
MR. BAUTISTA: Your Honor, in regards to sentencing, 
6 he asked me ear lier this morning he would be sentenced today 
7 if his motion was denied. I told him my understanding, it was 
8 for a motion hearing and motion hearing only. He said good 
9 because his mother and grandmother --
10 THE DEFENDANT: My surrogate sister -- my sister said 
11 they wanted to be here on my behalf, but they have no plans to 
12 be here because it's a motion hearing. My mom has passed away. 
13 So she can't be here except in .spirit . 
14 MR. BAUTISTA: We're asking if we may set sentencing 
15 over so that he can be in that position. And this is not his 
16 fault; it's mine, because I did tell him that I didn't think 
17 I thought we would be doing the motion and then setting it 
18 over. 
19 THE COURT: We can set it over. 
THE DEFENDANT: Thank you. 20 
21 MR. DEESING: Judge, if we're going to set it over, 
22 we just simply ask we set it in a week. The victims are here. 
23 They've been here multiple times for sentencing. It's a 
24 continuation of victimizing these poor women is the State's 




Statement of Defendant in Support of Guilty Plea 
(R938:154-64) 

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE GOUNlY;-STATE OF UTAH 
EN EL TR1BUNAL JUDICIAL DEL TERCER DISTRITO 
CONDADO DE SALT LAKE, ESTADO DE UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH . STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT . 
ESTADD DE UTAH IN SUPPORT OF GUil TY PLEA 
- AND C_ERTIFICATE··oF . 
Plaintiff, COUNSEL 
vs Demand ante . AFIRMACION DEL ACUSADO . 
- EN APOYO A SU DECLARACION . 
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. DE CULPABILIDAD Y CERTIFICADO 
[~yu~i 
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. DELASESORLEGAL · . 
. eindant . 
I_& /qrr q38= F.s Acusado. . Case No. . 
No. de caso. 
Yo,---------~ por media de la siguiente reconozco y certifico que 
he sida asesorado y que entiendo los siguientes hechos y derechos: . · 
Notification of CJ:iarges 
Noffficaci6n de Cargos 
· J am pleading g~r~nt~o the fol{oWing crimes: 







Crim~ & Sta~ry 
Provision 




Min/Max and / or 
~inimum Mandatory 
Pena Min/Max y/o 
Minimo Mandatorio 
I have received a copy of the (Amended) Information against me. l have read it. 
or had.it read to me, and I understand the nature and the elements of crime(s) to which 
I am pleading guilty~- · 
He recibido una copia (reforma~a) del Documeni:o aCtJsatorio en mi contra Lo he !er do, 
o me lo han leido y entiendo la naturaleza y las elementos del(os) delito(s) por el (los) cual(es) 
me deciai-o culpable (o si11 argumento). 
00155 
.. . : - .... .... : __ ..... · ----........... _______ ., · .. 
The elements of the crime(s) to which I am.pleading guilty (or no contest) are: 




111CQ. M C11.s Q_ 1 } Jfo I :¼, ,lllrl o. \'IA ~~"j ti I• =. l~~m 
I un erstand that by pleading guilty J will be admitting that I committed the crimes 
listed· above. (.Gf;-tf-1 am pfesding no co11twt, J fll1f1iofci5ntesfing U 1at I comrmtf:ed--1-1th-HC0.....__-
··. ~gQil tg cfil i !~)- I stiQ!-]l~te_ and agr~Jor, IT I _am R.leadif!g no co11tE?st. I do f}pt qisP.ut~ 
or oon:test) that the following .facts describe my conduct and the conduct of other 
persons for which I am criminally liable. These facts provide a basis for the court to 
accept my g1..1_ilty (~leas and prove the elements of the crime(s) to which I 
am pleading guilty~ conte.;t},; 
. Entiendo que al declaranne culpable estare admitiendo ·que cometf e! delito (las delitos) 
mencionado(s) anterionnente. (0, si me declaro sin argt.nnento, no disputare que cometf los 
delitos que anteceden). Yo estipulo y estoy de acuerdo (o si me deciar~ sin argument□, no 
disputo ni refuto) que los siguientes hechos describen mi conducta y la conducta de otras 
personas por las cuales soy responsable legalmente_ Estos hechos pro_veen las bases para 
que el tribunal acepte mi declaraci6n de cufpabilidad (o sin argum~nto) y comprueba las 
elementos de! delito (I s derrtos) por el cual (las cuales} me estoy declarando culpa le 
argumento 
eMtJ~tm ~~$ lo.-Bte,· IIDJ~ i.M .lwkf: ~· p ~~"5 ~' 
Waiver of Constitutional Rights 
Renuncia de Ios derechos consf:itucionales 
I am entering these pleas voluntarily'. I understand that I have the following 
rights under the constitutions of Utah and of the United States. l also understand that 
if i plead guilty (Df<-~t} I will give up all the following rig_hts: 
Doy esta declaraci6n voluntariamente. Entienda que tengo los siguientes eerechos 
bajo la consf:ituci6n de utah y de las Estados Unidos. Tambi~n entiendo que si me declaro 00156 
culpable (o sin argument□) renunciare a·!os siguientesrlerechos 
. 
- - - - -- -- ------ - - ---- ~--- - - --- -- - - ---------- -- - -- -- - ~ ----- -- --
Counsel: I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if 
I cannot afford one, an attorney wili be appointep by the court at no cost to me. I 
understand that I might later, if the judge determined that I was able, be required to pay 
for the appointed lawyer's service to me. 
Asesoramiento: Se que tengo eJ derecho de ser representado por un abogado y que si 
no puedo costear uno, se me asignara un abogado -par parte def tribunal sin costo alguno para 
mL Entiendo que posteriormente, si el juez determinara que soy solvente se me requerira 
pagar por~ Is se. ·aos del abogado que ~e fue asignado. . 
· J (h ve o (have) waived my rightto counsel. If.I have waived my rightto 
counsel, I done so knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily for the following 
.reasons: . 
He (no he) renunciado a mt derecho de asesora miento legal. Si he renunciado a mi 
derecho de asesoramiento legal, Io he hecho a sabiehdas, inteligente y voluotariamer.ite 
por las siguientes razones: 
If I have waived my rights to counsel, I certify that I have read this statement 
. and that I understand the nature and elements of the charges and crimes to which I 
am pleading guilty (or no contest). I also understand m¥•.rights in this case and other 
cases and the consequences of my guilty (or no contest) plea(s). 
· Sf yo he renunciado a mi derecho de asesoramiento legal, certffico que he Ief do esta 
afirrnaci6n y que 'entiendo la naturaleza y los elementos de los cargos y delitos por las cuales 
me declaro culpablff (a sin argumento). Tambien ~ntiendo mis derechos en este caso y otros 
casos y las consecuencias de mi(s) dedaraci6n{es) de culpabilidad 
ff I av: not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is 
..-J:;.-q.-1-'4-,a.+-+~'4-Jb_.,_..... _. My attorney and I have fully discussed this statement. my 
rights, and tfie co sequences of my guilty (or no contest) plea{s). 
Si no he renunciado a mi derecho de asesotia legal, mi abogado es 
----------:.--~ Mi abogado y yo hemes platicado a fondo de esta afirmacion, mis 
derechos y las consecuencias de mi{s) declaraci6n(es) de culpabilidad {a sin aryumento) 
Jury7"rial: I know that t have a right to a speedy and public bial by an impartial 
(unbiased) jury and ~at I will be giving up that right by pleading gui~f« s,.:mte:sij. 
Juicio por jurado. Se q1,1e tengo el derecho a un juicio publico y sin demora ante un 
jurada imparcial (sin prejuicio) y que estare renunciando a ese derecho al declararrne culpable 
( o ~in argurnento ). 
Confronfatior:i and cross-examination of witnesses: J know that if I were to 
have a trial, a) I would have the right to see and observe the wffnesses who tesfified 
against me and b) my attorney, or myself if !waived my rJghtto an attorney, would 
have the opportunity to cross-examine all of the witnesses who testified against me. 
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Careo y contra interrogatorio de Jos testigos. Se que si tuviera unjl!icio, a) Tendrfa 
el derecho de very observar a los testigos que tesffliquen en mi contra y b) mi abogado, o yo 
si renunciara. a mi derecho de abogado, tendrfan la oportunidad de contra interrogar a todos 
Ios testigos que testifiquen. en mi contra. 
Right to compel wimesses: l know that if l were to have a trial, l could call 
witnesses if l chose to, and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the · 
attendance and testimony of those witnesses. : If I could not afford to pay for the 
wttnesses to appear, the state would pay those costs. · . · .. 
Derecho de··obligar a testigos. Se que si tuviera un juicio, podria elegir llamar a 
testigos, y podria obtener comparendos requiriendo la asistencia y testimonio de esos 
testigos. Si no pudiera costear el pago de los tesfigos, el Estado.cubriria las costas. 
Righfto testify and privilege against self-incrimination: l know that if J were 
to have a mar, I would have the right to testify on.my own behalf. · I also know that if J 
cJ,..._gse r:iot to t$stify, no on.e 9ould make me--~tify or-make me give evidence against. 
myself. I also ki:iow that if I chose not to testify, the jury would be toJd-tbai they· could-
not hold my refusal to testify against me. 
Derecho a testificar y f;!I privilegio en contra de Ia auto-incriminacion. Se que si 
tuviera un juicio, yo tendria er derecho de dar testin;ionio a mi favor. Tambien se que si no 
deseara testificar, nadie podrfa obligarrne a dar testimonio o presentar pruebas en contra de 
mi mismo. Tambien se que si yo eligiera no dar testlmonio, al jurado se le indicaria que no 
podrf an usar mi decision en mi contra. 
Pr~umption of innocence and ·hurden of proof: I know that rf I do not plead 
guiity ( or no contest), 1 am presumed innocent uhtil the State proves that I am guilty of 
the charged crime(s). If I choose to fight the charges against me, I need only plead 
"not guilty," and my case will be set for a trial. At a trial, the State would have.the 
burden of proving each element of fhe charges{s) beyond a reasonable doubt ff the 
trial is before a jury, the verdict must be unanimous, meaning that each juror would 
have to find me guilty. 
Presuncion d~ iriocencia y responsabilidad de prueba. Se que si .no me declare 
culpable {o sin argument<;>), se me presume ser ino~nte hasta que la fiscalfa compruebe que 
soy culpable de! Oas) delito(s) imputado(s). Si elijo pelear las cargos en mi contra, solo 
necesito declararme "no culpable,• y mi caso sera fi]ado parajuicio. En eljuicio, la fiscalfa 
tendrf a la responsabilidad de comprobar cada uno de las elementos de! (Ios) cargo(s} mas alla 
de una duda razonable. Si el juicio fuera ante un juraqo, el veredicto debera ser unanime, 
quiere decir que cada miembro del jurado tendra que ·encontranne culpable 
I understand that.if I plead guilty (or Fl® ~crttest), I give up the presumption of 
inno~ence and will be admitting that I committed the crime(s) stated above. 
· Entiendo que si me declare culpable {o sin argumento), renuncio a Ia presunci6n de 
inocencia y admitire que cometi el (los) delito(s} previamente mencionado(s). · 
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Appeal: I know that unde,r the Utah Cons~on, if I we~ convicted by a jury or 
judge, I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not 
afford the costs of an appeal, the Slate would_pay those costs fur me. I understand .. 
mat I am giving up my right to appeal my conviction if I plead guilty (or no contest). I 
understand that if I wish to appeal my senfence I must file a notice of appeal within 30 
days after my sentence is entered. 
Apelacion. Se que bajo la Constib.Jci6n de Utah, si fuera condenado por un jurado o 
juez, tendrf a el derecho de apelar mi condena y sentencia Si no pudiera costear las costas de 
la apelacion, el Estado cubriria esas costas. Entiendo que al declararrne culpable (o sin 
argumento) renuncio a mi derecho de apelar mi condena. Entiendo que si deseo apelar mi 
sentencia debo presentar notificaci6n de mi apelaci6n dentro de treinta df as despues de 
asentada mi sent£:ncia . ' 
· . I know and understand thatbt pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up 
all the statutory and constitutional rights as explained above. 
· ~~-Y. e11t:iEIDfl.9 .QAe i!-I pec.la.rar.me . .culpabJ~.r.erumcio y c.erlo. t-edos mis derechos 
estatutarios y constitu.cionales previamente explicados.- .. . . 
Consequences of Entering a Guilty f6i" Niitfo, 1®) Plea 
Consecuencias de dar una declaraci6n de culpabilidad ( o sin argumento) 
Potential penalties: I know fue maximum sentence that may be imposed for 
each crime to which I am pleading guilty y p ......... .,..·~~w+ 
o carries man 
eta setving'"a manda'tmy-fl□nalty-for that srime . 
. prison term, fine, or both. 
Penas potenciales~ Se la pena maxima que se podria irnp~ner por cada delito del 
ct1alme estoy dedarando culpable {o sin argumento). Se que al decfararme culpable (o sin 
argumento) de un delito que lleve consigo una pena obligatoria, me estare sujetando a servir 
Ja pena obiigatoria por ese delito. Se que mi sentencia puede incluir un tennino en la prisi6n, 
una multa o ambos · 
l know that in addition to a fine, an nin~ty percent (90%) surcharge wm be 
imposed. I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my 
crimes, including any resmution that may be owed on charges thiif are dismissed as 
part of a plea agreement . 
Se que auhado a una multa, se impondn:i un noventa porciento (90%) en n::cargos. 
Tambien se que se me podri~ ordenar"reintegrar a cualquier vf ciima de mis delitos, induyendo 
reintegro que se deba por cargos que sean desestimados coma parte del trafo declaratorio. 
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Conse~utive/concurrent prison terms: I know that if there is more than one 
crime involvea, the sentences may be imposed one after another (consecutively), or 
they may run at the same time (concurrently). I know that I may be charged an 
additional fine for eaeh crime that I plead to. I also know that if I am on probation or 
parole, or awaiting sentencing on another offense of which I have been convicted or 
'which I have plead guilty (or no confest), my guilty €@!; &a~JJI 1tesj;) plea(s) now may 
result in consecutive sentences being imposed on me. If the offense to which.I am 
now pleading guilty occurred when I was imprisoned or on parole, I know the law 
requires the court to impose consecutive sentences unless the court finds and states 
on the record that consecutive sentences would !Je inappropriate. 
Terminos de plisi6n consecutivos/simultaneos. Se que si hubiera mas de un delito 
involucrado, las ·penas podrian ser irnpuestas una despues de la otra (consecutivamente), o 
podrian ser s~rvidas al mismo tiempo, (simultaneamente). Se que se me podria cobrar una 
multa adicionaJ por cada defrto por el cuaJ haya dado mi declaraci6n. Tambien se que si estoy 
bajo libertad provisional o preparatoria, 6 si estoy esperando recibir sentencia por algun otro 
_ ,dettf:o,..-wr~J .. ~!J_?,J.Jli!.Y.g. pid_o_ conde~.....do o r-F1e:l_li;y_a:d~q~-culpaple-Eo.~in argumi;;n.te.Lmi(s)-
. declaraci6n(es) de culpabilidad (o sin argumento) que doy ahora podrian resuttar en la 
imposici6n de sentencias consecutivas. Si el delito por el cual me. estoy declarando culpable 
sucedi6 cuando me encontraba preso o bajo libi;rtad preparatoria, se que Ia Iey requiere que 
el tibunal imponga sentencias consecutivas a menos que el tribunal fa!le y haga constar em el 
acta que las sentencias consecutivas serian inaprcjpiadas. . . 
Plea agreement: My guilty (or~plea(s({is?ar'e)) (is/are not) the result 
ofa plea agreement between myself and the prosecutin~ey. All the promises, 
· duties and provisions of the plea agreement, if any, are fully contained in this 
statement, including those explained below: . 
Trata declaratorio. Mi(s) declaraci6n(es) de culpabilidad (o sin argumerfto) es (son) el 
resultado de un trato declaratorio que tie hecho con el abogado fiscal. Todas las promesas, · 
deberes y provisiones de este trato declaratorio, si hubiera alguno, se encuentran en su 
totalidad en esta ~rmacion, inclt,Jyendo aquellas expficadas a continuacion: 
e:.~~1¥ttf~= tmd I ,:&aiu ,6· k WW I I . . UhfW'-l . · d ,, 1k£i -!oo.. . --~p'1,~i ~o" 
~rial judg6~:: I know 1ha~y charge Qr s~ncing concession or l-P .I eo"""' 
recommendation of probation or suspended ~enfence, including a reduction of the fO'Jl/p IOi~ ~f-km_~ 
charges for sentencing, made or sought by _either defense counsel or the prosecuting~d ~l~~ 
attorney are not bindi[1g on the judge_ I also know that any opinions they express to ot' W,f\) 
me as to what they beITeve the Judge may do _a~e not binding on the judge. _ fo~o~. 
00160 
El juez de primera instancia µo esti obligado. Se que cuaJquier cargo, o concesi6n 
de sentenc;;ia o recomendaci6n de Jib.ertad condicional, o sentenciasuspendida, incluyendo 
una reclucci6n de los cargos para el dictado de Ia sentencia, que haya sido hecho o solicitado 
ya· sea por el abogado de defensa o el fiscal no son obfigatorias para el juez. Tambien se que 
cualquier idea expresada ante mi concemiente a lo que se piensa que el juez pueda hacer no 
son obligatorias para el juez. 
ImmigrationlDeporfation: I understand that if I am not a United States citizen, 
my plea(s) today may, or even will, subject me to deportation under United States 
immigration laws and regulations, or otheiwise adversely affect my immigration status, 
which may include permanently barring my re-entry into the United States. l 
understand that rf l have quesiions about the effect of my plea on my immigration 
status, I should consult with an immigration attorney. _ 
lomigraci6n/Deportaci6n: Entiendo que s1 no- soy ciudadano de las Estado Unidos, 
mi(s) declaraci6n(es) deJ dia de hoy podria, o cier.tamente me sujetara a deportaci6n bajo las 
_Jey.~ Y..r~erg~~~~~-Jm1-t~~~i6~_ ~~~~~~s~~? 1:J!1!~o.:>~2. d_e_<?~_.IJ!~n~13_ af:e~~n. __ 
negativamente m1 estaao m1gratono, que podna mdu1t el 1mpedir mt reingreso a Ios Estados· 
·. ·f:ff-dfib~'Entienao que si tengo preguntas acerca de! efecto que tendra mi declaraci6n de 
culpabilidad en mi estado migratorio, debo consultar con un abogado de emigraci6n. 
Defendant's Certification of Voluntariness 
Certfficaci6n de voluntariedad def acusado 
I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force, threats or 
unlawful influence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty$ ne-
~? promises excepfthose contained in this statement have be~n made to 
ma -
Estoy dando esta declaraci6n por mi propia y libre voluntad. No se han utilizado fuerza 
ni amenazas o coacci6n de ningun tipo para cgnvencerme de declaranne culpable (o sin · 
argumento). Nose me ha hecho ninguna promesa con excepcion de aquellas que se 
encuentran en esta afinnaci6n . 
. 
1 have read this_st.rl:ement, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and 1 · 
understand its contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I am 
free to change or· delete anything contained in this statement,_ but l do not wish to 
·make any changes because all of the statemenls are correct. 
He leido esta afirmaci6n, o me la ha lefdo·mi abogado, entiendo sus contenidos y 
adopto cada afumaci6n aqui contenida coma mia propia. Se que soy libre de cambiar o borrar 
cualquier afirmaci6n contenida en este documento pero no deseo hacer ning(m cambio 
porque todas las afirmaciones en este son correctas. 
I am satisfied witlradvice and assistance of my attorney. 
Estoy satisfecho(a) con el asesoramiento y servicio de mi abogado{a). 
0016{·· 
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I am lf ~ vears of age. I have attended school through the ~rade. I 
can read an~rstand the Ermlish language. If l do not understand English, an 
interpre~1::r has been provided to me.• I was not under the influence of any drugs, 
medication, or intoxicants which would impaifmy judgment when I decided to plead 
guilty. I am not presently under the influence of any drug, medication, or intoxicants 
which impair my judgment 
Tengo _ afios de edad. He asisfido hasta el __ grado escoiar. Puedo leery 
entender el idioma ingl~s-. Si no enfiendo el ingles, se me ha proporcionado un interprete. No 
me encontraba bajo la influencia de ningun estupefaciente, medicina, o embriagante que . 
pudiera impedir mi sano juicio 9.la@..Q _decidi dec!ararme culpable. En este momenta no me 
encuentro bajo la influencia de n1?igun estupefaciente, medicina, o embriagante que pueda 
impedir mi sano juicio. . 
I believe myself to be of sound and _discerning mind and to be mentally capable 
of understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. I am free of 
.. ai:iy_qien~l qi~~a~~ ~@f~, .or !mP§I]i:rp.ent tl:lc:t ~quid PJJ;ll.er.u me. fro!TI~~nderstanging 
. what I am doing or from knowingly,.intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea. 
Me considero de mente sana, ·capaz de discemiry entender este procedimiento y fas 
· consecuencias de mi declaraci6n. Estoy fibre de cualquier enfermedad mental, defecto 0 
impedimenta que me evite entender lo que estoy hacienda o que evite que de mi declaraci6n 
a sabiendas, inteligente y voluntariamente. 
I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty ~Bi'ife:st) plea(s), I 
must file a written motion to withdraw my pfea(s) before sentence is announced. 
I under.stand that for a plea held in abeyance, a mofion to withdraw from the plea 
agreement must be made within 3(? days of pleading guilty or no contest I will 
only be allowed to withdraw my plea if I show that it was not knowingly and 
· voluntarily made. I understand tha~ any challenge to my plea(s) made after 
sentencing must be pursued under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act in Tit[e 78 . . 
Chapter 35a, and Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Enfiendo .que si quisiera retirar mi(s} declaraci6n(es) de culpabilidad (o sin 
argumento}, debo presentar una petici6n escrita para refirar mi(s) declaracion(es) antes 
que se pronuncie la sentencia. Entiendo que par,t una Declaraci6n en suspenso, fa 
peticion para retiranne del trato dec~e..~torio debe ser hecha dentro de freinta dfas de 
mi declaraci6n de cuf pabilidad o sin argumento. Solamente se me pennifira retirar mi 
declaraci6n de culpabilidad si demuestro que no fue dada a sabiendas y 
voiuntariamente. Entiendo que para disputar mi(s} declaraci6n(es) de cufpabifidad 
despues de recibida la sente,ncia debere hacerlo bajo Ia Ley de Remedios Post-
condenat<:>rios Tm.do 78, Capitulo 35a, y Ia Regla 65C del las Reglas def Procedimiento 
Penal de Uf:ah. 
Dated this~ day of 'r 2op 





Certificate of D_efense Attorney 
Certificado del abogado defensor 
I certify that 1 ·am the attorney for _,;,.c= ______ lr".L"-"-+~-----' the 
defendant above; and that I know he/she has read the sta. e nt or that I have read it 
to him/h_~r. I have discussed it yvith him/her and believe that he/she fully understands 
.. the meaning of its contents and is merrtally and physically competent To the best of 
my knowledge and belief, after an appropriate investigation, the elements of the 
crime(s) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's-criminal conduct are correctly · 
stated; and these, along with the other representations and declarations made by the 
defendant in the foregoing affidavit:, are accurate and true. · 
. Certffico que soy el abogado de · . el acusado 
previamente mencionado, y que se que el/ella ha leido la afirmaci6n o que yo·se Ia he lefdo a 
el/ella; He hablado con eUeila de esta afirmaci6n y me parece que el /ella entiende 
=completa.rnente ~nfficade-de·sl=f-CGntenido.-y,.e~. cempetente. fisica--y rnentalmente. Ami leal 
saber y entender, despues de una invesfigaci6n apropiada, os elementos del(los) delito(s) y (a 
sinopsis de los hechos de la conducta penada del acusa o co ectos; , · nto con los 
·· otros comentarios y aseveraciones hechos por el acusa em I a avit pre ·rrectos y 
verdaderos. I 
Certificate of Prosecuting Attorney 
Certificado de! abogado fiscal 
fu~ . . , defendant r have reviewed this Statement of Defendant and ~~ I am 1he ~1\lF lnel,l:ata of lJ1ah in the case against · . 
find that theci:ual basis of fue defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes fue 
offense(s) is true and correct Na improper intlucements, ihreats, or coercion to 
. encourage a plea has been offered to defendant The plea negotiations are fully 
contained in th~ Statement a~d ilJ~,-,ij~~~,J?l~?.f\9reeIJ1ent or as supplemented 
on the record before the Cour[·:·Tuere ~ reasonable cause to believe ihat the 
evidence would support the conviction of defendant for fue offense(s} for which fue 
plea(s) is/are entered and that the acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the public 
interest 
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Certifico que soy el abogado representando al Estado de Utah en el caso en contra de! 
acusado . . He repasado esta Afirrnaci6n de! acusado y 
encuentro que Jos hechos en los que se basa la conducta penal del acusado constftuyen·el 
delito y son verdaderos y correctos. Nose ha ofrecido al acusado ningun incentive, amenaza 
o intimidaci6n para alentar su declaraci6n. Las negociaciones para Ia dec!aracion se 
encuentran en su totalidad en esta afirrnaci6n y en el Trato declaratorio adjunto, se han 
suplementado en el acta ante ef tribunal. Hay causas razonables para creer que la evidencia 
respaldara la condena del acusado par el (J[?s) defrto(s) por el (los) GUal {cuales) da su(s) 
declaraci6n(es) y que Ia aceptaci6n de la(s) declaraci6n(es) servira Ios intereses def publico. 
Al-~DRNEY 
. Bar No.\ 2>1'1() · 
ABOGADO FISCAL . 




Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement ~nd the certifications of 
the defendant and counsel, and based on any oral representations in court, the Court 
~itnesse~ the signatures and finds the defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) is/are 
freely, knowingly, and voluntarily niade. · 
Basa<;!o en las hechos previamente presentados y en la certfficaci6n deI(a) acusado(a) 
y su asesor juridico, y_ basado en las affrrnaciones 
1
dadas ante el tribunal, el juez coma testigo 
d~ las firm as falla que la(s) declaraci6n(es) de culpabilidad (o sin argumento) de! acusado ha 
(han) sido dada(s) libre, a sabienc;ias y voluntariamente · · · 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED thattlie·defendanfs guilty (or no contest) plea(s) to 
the crime(s) set forth in the Statement be accepted and entered. 
POR LO TANTO SE ORDENA que la(s) declaraci6n(es) de·culpabilidad (o sin 
argumento) de! acusado presentada en esta Afinnacion, sea aceptada y asentada. 
Dated this [ v{ day of /J-p µ"' / ,2012. 
Distlict Court Ju ge: 
JUEZ DEL TRIBUNAL DE D!STR!TO 





Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea & 
Declaration of Ernest Clayton Harper 
(R938:306-11) 

Rudy J. Bautista (8636) 
BAUTISTA, BOOTH & PARKINSON, PC 
215 South State Street, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-6666 
Facsimile: (801) 618-3835 
Email: rudy@bbpdefense.com 
Attorne_vsfhr Defendant 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ERNEST CLAYTON HARPER, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY 
PLEA 
Case No. 161911938 
Judge Katie Bernards-Goodman 
Ernest Harper, by and through counsel, Rudy J. Bautista, respectfully moves this Court to 
withdrav.r his guilty plea to Count l, Stalking, a second-degree felony. tendered on April 14, 
2017. 
Utah law permits a defendant to withdraw a plea of guilty "upon leave of the court and a 
showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made ... before sentence is announced.'' 
Utah Code Ann.§ 77-13-6(1). Whether the withdrawal is permitted is ''within the sound 
discretion of the trial court." State v. Gallegos, 738 P.2d 1040. l 041 (Utah 1987). However, 
such motions should "be liberally granted." hL. at 1042. 
In cases determining whether a confession is voluntary or coerced, Utah courts have considered 
the defendant's "mental condition a more significant factor in the 'voluntariness' calculus." State v. 
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Rcttenbergct, 1999 UT 80,984 P.2d 1009, 1014 (Utah 1999) (guoting Colorado v. Conncllv, 479 U.S. 
157, 164 (1986)). The 1Jtah Supreme Court has thus set fo1th that, in such an analysis of voluntariness, 
·'courts must also consider such factors as the defendant's mental health. mental deficiency. emotional 
instability, education, age, and familiarity with the judicial system." Rettenberger, 984 P.2d at IO 14 
(citing Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707, 712 (1967) (education); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 
602-03 (1961) (mental deficiency); _$.pano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315,322 (1959) (emotional 
instability); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191,193 (1957) (mental health)). 
In his Declaration, Mr. Harper details that he suffers from PTSD and depression, and has 
panic attacks when confronted with stress. See also Mental Health Treatment Plan, dated July 12, 
20 I 7, filed as non-pub! ic information. Mr. Harper is also currently facing the possibility of 
losing custody of his son. Under these stressful circumstances, Mr. Harper's emotional instability 
prevented him from kno\vingly and voluntarily appreciating the full the consequences of his 
guilty plea, especially also taking into account his interpretation of his attorney's advice at the 
time. 
For the foregoing reasons, defendant respectfully requests this Court withdraw his guilty 
plea made on April 14, 2017. 
DATED this 8th day of August, 2017. 
2 
Isl Rudv J. Bautista 
Rudy J. Bautista 
Attorney for Mr. Harper 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the MOTION TO WITHDRAW 
GUILTY PLEA was e-filed, on this 8th day of August, 2017 to the following: 
Salt Lake County District Attorney's Office 
l 11 East Broadway, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
,., 
,) 
/s/ Shamim Monshizadeh 
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Rudy J. Bautista (8636) 
BAUTISTA, BOOTH & PARKINSON, PC 
215 South State Street, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (80 I) 364-6666 
Facsimile: (801) 618-3835 
Email: rudy(q}bbpdefense.com 
AttorneysfiJr Defendant 
IN THE THIRD JUD1CIAL D1STR1CT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, DECLARATION OF ERNEST 
CLAYTON HARPER 
Plaintiff: 
vs. Case No.161911938 
ERNEST CLAYTON HARPER, 
Defendant. Judge Katie Bernards-Goodman 
l, Ernest Clayton Harper, hereby declare, as follows: 
l. l am the defendant in the above-numbered case. 
2. On April 14, 2017, I pleaded guilty to count 1, stalking, a second-degree felony. 
3. 1 thought that I would be placed on probation, and maybe some jail. 
4. I did not know that by pleading guilty, l could be sent to prison. I did not know that AP&P 
,vould recommend prison. 
5. Michael Peterson, my attorney at the time, told me I'll get probation and I should plead 
because of that. 
6. Mr. Peterson also told me I would never see my son again unless I plead. 
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7. 1 have panic attacks ,vhcn confronted with ove1whclming stress. I also have PTSD and 
depression. 
8. I am terrified of losing my son. l believe my wife wants me to go to prison so that she can 
take my son away from me. 
I declare under penalty of pc1jury that the foregoing is true and correct and would be my 
testimony if I were testifying in a court of law. 
Dated this 8th day of August, 2017. 
/s/ Ernest Clayton lfarper 
Ernest Clayton Harper 
Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
l HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the DECLARATION OF 
ERNEST CLAYTON HARPER was e-filed, on this 8th day of August, 2017 to the following: 
Salt Lake County District Attorney's Office 
111 East Broad,vay, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Isl Shamim Monshizadeh 
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